The Concept of Time

The First Draft of Being and Time

martin Heidegger

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THE CONCEPT OF TIME

MARTIN HEIDEGGER

Translated by Ingo Farin
With Alex Skinner
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This is the first translation into English of Heidegger's so-called review article 'Der Begriff der Zeit' which he wrote in 1924 for the journal *Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*. For various reasons the article was not published in the journal at that time.* Instead it appeared posthumously in Volume 64 of the *Gesamtausgabe* (pp. 3–103) in 2004.** Without question, this article is 'the very first draft' of *Being and Time*.*** The chapters of the article outline much of the content and structure of Heidegger's *magnum opus*. Chapter 2 of the article, 'The Original Ontological Characteristics of Dasein', prefigures Division 1 of *BT*: 'The Preparatory Analysis of Dasein'; Chapter 3, 'Dasein and Temporality', shows up as the heading of Division 2; Chapter 4, 'Temporality and Historicity', is the title of Chapter 5 in Division 2. Moreover, about five pages of Chapter 1, 'Dilthey's Key Concerns and Yorck's General Outlook', reappear verbatim in § 77 of *BT*. So it is not only the close thematic 'overlap' but also the structural arrangement


**Volume 64 also contains a lecture with the same title, 'Der Begriff der Zeit', which Heidegger delivered to the Marburg Theological Department in 1924. This lecture has been translated for an English bilingual edition: Martin Heidegger, *The Concept of Time*, trans. William McNeill (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992).

***Th. Kisiel, *The Genesis*, p. 323. See also von Hermann's 'Afterword' to Volume 64, p. 132.
that makes this article the nucleus of a project eventually culminating in *Being and Time*.

We do not know whether Heidegger would have changed the present form of the article for its planned publication in 1925. A number of repetitions and abrupt transitions indicate that this is not a polished and final version. Yet the text reflects the enormous intellectual energy and excitement behind Heidegger's main philosophical discovery, namely that *temporalness* and, on this basis, *historicity* are the key to Dasein, Dasein's ontology, and the ontology of the world. Heidegger is determined to harness this insight in three interrelated ways. First, he uses it to deconstruct a metaphysics that is forgetful of time despite being beholden to one form of temporalness, namely presencing. Second, he provides the outline of an ontology of Dasein that incorporates temporalness as a defining aspect, bringing the inevitable horizon of finite time – death – into life. Third, he shows how the *hermeneutic situation* that grounds all interpretation, including interpretations of ontology, is itself founded on the temporal or historical context of one's own lifetime and that of one's generation.

The occasion for the article was the 1923 publication of the correspondence between Dilthey and Yorck von Wartenburg. In the Introduction, Heidegger writes that his aim is 'to enable contemporary researchers to engage productively with the legacy of Dilthey and Yorck'. In particular, Heidegger was struck by Yorck's feeling for the pervasive historical dimension in human Dasein. In a letter from 1924, Heidegger expresses his admiration for Yorck by writing that he was 'half a century ahead of his time'.* Ideas on historical being are Heidegger's stepping stone to the question of being at large. But for all his praise of Dilthey and Yorck, Heidegger fully embraces the phenomenological project, a return to the things themselves, including the temporal structures of Dasein. As Heidegger writes in Chapter 2, 'the method of this investigation is a phenomenological one'. Heidegger is not playing Dilthey or Yorck off against Husserl. Rather, he is attempting to elaborate a research programme for a hermeneutical phenomenology.

In its present form, the text is not a final statement of Heidegger's position in 1924. Not all chapters are equally well developed. The Introduction and Chapter 1 are much more carefully written than Chapter 3, which, according to the German editor, is a shortened and

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*In Storck & Kisiel, p. 203.
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condensed version of an earlier draft. Moreover, Heidegger's style varies. It is much smoother in the Introduction and Chapters 1 and 4 than in Chapter 3, which makes few concessions to the reader. Any interpretation of this text must take this into account.

In Chapter 3, Heidegger warns against the 'misunderstanding' that would summarize his view as: 'Dasein is in each case time'. Heidegger was always far more nuanced than many of his critics acknowledge. The review article is best understood as 'preliminary notice' of his own research, as Heidegger states in the Introduction to this work. As such it is an important way station, not a fixed doctrine.

The German publication of Heidegger's text is based on Elfride Heidegger's handwritten copy of the original, which is lost. During a visit to the Deutsche Literaturarchiv in Marbach in the summer of 2010, I was able to study the extant text and compare it to the printed edition in Volume 64, which is an absolutely accurate reproduction of the handwritten copy, satisfying all the requirements of a critical edition. Heidegger's later marginal corrections and annotations to Elfride Heidegger's copy are all painstakingly included in that edition in the form of footnotes, giving us an excellent window into Heidegger's thought processes. This translation includes all Heidegger's footnotes and annotations.

A few technical remarks about the translation. First, to facilitate smooth reading, Alex Skinner and I decided to break up overly long stretches of text into separate paragraphs. Second, where possible we carefully replaced Heidegger's extreme use of the passive voice with the more idiomatic active voice in English. Third, we generally adhered to the standard translations that can be found in Heidegger literature, and followed the custom of leaving the word 'Dasein' untranslated. In contrast to many translations, however, we decided not to capitalize 'being' ('das Sein'). A glossary lists the key translation choices.

Heidegger's original footnotes are marked by an asterisk *. Marginal notes that Heidegger added later are also given as footnotes, indicated by Arabic numerals inside round brackets (). Heidegger's annotations to footnotes are placed under the respective footnotes, using Roman numerals. Notes and explanations by the German editor and the translator are placed as endnotes, indicated by Arabic numerals without brackets. Where the German editor could not decipher a word in the manuscript he left a question mark (?), which is reproduced in the

* Vol. 64, p. 127.
translation. All round brackets ( ) in the body of the text are Heidegger's. Square brackets [ ], mostly for the purpose of providing key German terms and sometimes for clarification (especially of the marginal notes), are insertions for this translation. Pagination numbers in the margins (<1>, <2>, etc.) refer to the original German edition.

I would like to thank Alex Skinner for his absolutely essential contribution to this translation. Without him it would not exist at all. While I provided the first raw translation, Alex worked on every sentence to give it a more English feel. We then discussed the amended draft several times over, drawing on both my German and philosophical background and Alex's native English and skills as a professional translator. As the project for this translation was conceived during my time at St. John's College at Santa Fe, I had the good fortune to receive valuable comments on first drafts of parts of the translation from Jay Smith and Phil Bartok. Their encouragement at that early stage gave me the confidence to proceed with the translation.

I would like to thank Jeff Malpas for his generous support of this project and my work at the University of Tasmania in general. Many thanks are due to the Head of the School of Philosophy, Lucy Tatman, who did everything imaginable to ensure that I could devote all my energies to advancing this work. Adrian Staples has kindly taken the task upon himself to proofread the final version of the translation. Last but not least, I would like to thank the staff at the Deutsche Literaturarchiv in Marbach for their great hospitality and their help in finding relevant manuscripts. I am much indebted to the director of the Handschriftenabteilung, Ulrich von Bülow, who gave me crucial advice on a number of technical and practical questions. I would also like to acknowledge a very generous research grant from the University of Tasmania.

Ingo Farin
Blackmans Bay, November 2010
I was prompted to provide preliminary notice regarding the following investigation of time by the publication of the correspondence between Wilhelm Dilthey and Count Paul Yorck v. Wartenburg.* My study attempts to deepen our appreciation of this correspondence. My goal is to bring to light the original, positive tendency of the kind of research that informed the writing of these letters. In a letter dated June 4 1895, Yorck touches on the true and thus most genuine wellspring of this admirable friendship between two philosophers: ‘our shared interest in understanding historicity [Geschichtlichkeit]’ (p. 185).† The following study takes up this interest; it attempts to clarify the questions alive within it.

My aim here is not to observe history (world history) but to render historicity intelligible. Historicity signifies the historical being [Geschichtlichsein] of that which exists as history.‡ Hence the original intention of the

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† Implied in this is the question which being or entity exists really as history – the answer taken from the being of historicity what is primarily in it – temporality which entity ‘exists’ actually temporally – in such a manner – that it is time itself – this entity is then also actually historical

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abovementioned interest is not to clarify the objectivity of the historical, that is, to bring out the way in which history exists as an object observed by theoretical historiography \([Geschichtswissenschaft]\). This epistemological question is preceded by a more radical one as to the meaning of historical being \([Sinn des Geschichtlichseins]\). What is to be uncovered is the being-structure \([Seinsstruktur]\) of that being or entity that is history.

This project is an ontological one. It approaches \((\lambda\delta\gamma\omicron\omicron\zeta)\) an entity \((\delta\upsilon)\) in terms of that entity's being \((\delta\upsilon)\). Having identified the characteristics of the entity's being, it conceptualizes them in categories.* But if the characteristics of an entity's being are to be uncovered, we must begin our ontological investigation by gaining a clear view of the entity itself. The entity must, in light of its own nature, show itself \((\phi\alpha\upsilon\varepsilon\sigma\theta\omicron\alpha)\), i.e. it must become a phenomenon,\(^{1(1)}\) and it must be addressed \((\lambda\delta\gamma\omicron\omicron\zeta)\) just as it shows itself. Hence phenomenology is the only kind of research in which an ontological investigation can be initiated and sustained.

Historicity is a characteristic of being \([Seinscharakter]\). But of which being? The human Dasein. The task, therefore, is to lay bare this entity itself, in order to define it in terms of its being. The basic constitution of Dasein's being, from which we can read off historicity ontologically, is temporality. If we are to understand historicity, we must therefore provide a phenomenological explication of time.**

My aim in clarifying our key concern, which is to 'understand historicity', is to enable contemporary researchers to engage productively with the legacy of Dilthey and Yorck, unlocking its full potential. We thus require a brief overview of what these two friends, with their common interest, were trying to do. Each played a different role in the work meant to advance this interest. This difference must be taken into account in the following presentation. Dilthey produced elaborate and extensive investigations. All further studies will have to rely primarily

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\*\(\kappa\alpha\tau\epsilon\gamma\omicron\omega\rho\epsilon\eta\nu\) is a specific and, indeed, distinct \(\lambda\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\nu\) and means: to accuse publicly, that is, to tell someone to his face that it was he who .... An entity can be told outright and in the strictest sense what it is: its being \([Sein]\). So that which delineates and preserves an entity's being is a 'category'.

\(^{1(1)}\)be freed from obscuring prejudices and concepts

\**From a passage in Briefwechsel \([The Correspondence]\): 'I have just one treatise on inner perception and time still to write – when it is finished the second volume will be almost complete' (p. 107). This implies that Dilthey intended to tackle the phenomenon of time. We will know whether there are any completed studies upon publication of previously unseen materials in \([Dilthey's] Gesammelte Schriften [Collected Works]\).
on him.* In contrast, all we have from Yorck are individual, mostly basic thoughts and ideas. These he produced in haphazard fashion as he assisted his friend. They show him, as it were, at an advanced position on their common frontline [Kampfstellung]. He often sees more clearly and thinks more radically.\(^{(1)}\) If we wish to appropriate his thoughts correctly, we must place them entirely within the context of Dilthey’s extensive work and use them to benefit that work. Only in this way can Yorck’s letters be appreciated as letters from a friend who has just one concern, namely to help his co-philosophizing friend achieve something central to his existence, through living dialogue, and thereby do the same for himself. Attempting to satisfy our curiosity as to who was ‘the greater’ of the two, meanwhile, would merely cause us to misunderstand the sentiments [Gesinnung] held by these two friends.

We now have an outline of the present work. An introduction (Chapter 1) provides a brief account of Dilthey’s key concerns. In light of these, we shall elucidate Yorck’s philosophical standpoint with reference to representative passages from his letters. This is the framework for the examination of time. The analysis of Dasein in terms of the characteristics of its being (Chapter 2) provides the foundation for the explication of time (Chapter 3). Within this field of phenomena, laid bare in Chapters 2 and 3, we shall provide a basic outline of historicity as a being-structure of Dasein. At the same time, we shall define the research programme necessary to the ‘understanding’\(^{2}\) of historicity and Dasein (Chapter 4). This brings us back full circle while demonstrating our key intention, namely to cultivate the spirit of Count Yorck in the present, and contribute to the work of Dilthey.\(^{3}\)

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*The selfless labour of editing Dilthey’s Gesammelte Schriften conducted by G. Misch is of inestimable value. Only now can we make use of Dilthey’s various treatises to provide the younger generation with a scientific education in philosophy and the historical human sciences.

\(^{(1)}\) Whether he played the leading role in this remains an open question
All Dilthey’s work is motivated by the desire to comprehend scientifically the intellectual, socio-historical reality of humankind, of ‘life’, and to ensure that this comprehension rests on a sound scientific foundation. Scientific inquiry attempts to achieve an understanding\textsuperscript{4} of life in two ways. It does so first as philosophy, and here, according to Dilthey and Yorck, the ultimate aim is a moral-pedagogical one. Second, it does so as historical human science \textit{[historische Geisteswissenschaft]} that furnishes us with an account of life via its ‘objectifications’.

The test of the scientific character of the various disciplines of historical human science is that they determine the structures of life itself, which is their constant subject matter, as they work through its objectified forms. This is the only way of securely tethering the questions and interpretations of these individual sciences to the factual ground \textit{[Sachgehalt]} of their subject matter. As \textit{sciences} of the human mind, however, they must be justified through general propositions, which provide them with the methodological rules governing their theoretical approach \textit{[erkennendem Verhalten]}. But the propositions and rules must be gleaned from ‘cognition’ \textit{[‘Erkennen’]} itself, which is in turn underpinned by ‘the connectedness of mental life’\textsuperscript{5} (life). Any attempt to raise historical human science to the status of a true science thus gives rise to one key task. We are led to this task on two ‘fronts’, that of the subject matter and that of the theoretical disclosure which brings us closer to that subject matter. And this task is to examine thoroughly ‘the connectedness of mental life’ itself, in terms of its own structures.
Yet philosophy too is confronted with the same task of analysing 'the connectedness of mental life', insofar as it aims to develop a theory of humankind in accordance with the basic possibilities of human life. This analysis must bring into view 'the human being as total fact' — this thinking, willing, feeling being — with regard to 'the structural connectedness' of its experiences. This structural connectedness does not, as it were, run alongside life, does not happen to life; rather, it is 'experienced'. More precisely, the connectedness of mental life is experienced in such a way that in each of its actions and motivations the whole of life is there.

As something we experience, the structural connectedness of mental life is also a 'context of development'. Insofar as life is development, namely of something that is always concrete and historical, life's own history must become the organon of its comprehension. And the more reliably the historical sciences — that is, the historical disciplines — proceed along their own methodologically secured and conceptually clarified path, the more originally and forcefully this history speaks. The science of man; the concrete history of the development of man's intellectual powers; and the epistemological theory of both the science of man and the science of history constitute the tripartite goal which Dilthey always pursued as a whole. Whether explicitly or not, this is the aim of all of Dilthey's investigations and even the most rarefied of his concerns.

The foundation of his investigations lies in a 'psychology' of life, of the connectedness of mental life as such. As the aim is to comprehend 'life' as an original reality in its own right, the correct method of dealing with it scientifically can be determined only by recourse to life itself. Consequently, efforts towards such a 'psychology' cannot accommodate attempts at the scientific explanation of the mental as a natural object. The connectedness of mental life is primarily given in its unity [Einheit]; its individual structures can be understood by proceeding from — and returning to — this centrally important whole [Ganzen]. We cannot assemble the mental out of hypothetical elements. Yet any description of the connectedness of mental life must have the character of both secure and universally valid knowledge, if it is to satisfy the foundational task identified for it.*

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*In his 'preface' to Vol. V (1924, pp. VII–CXVII) of Dilthey's Gesammelte Schriften, G. Misch describes the development of Dilthey's work for the first time, with one eye already on Yorck's letters, drawing on Dilthey's 'diary entries' and 'sketches'.

**Or the interest of knowledge [Erkenntnissinn] of studying**
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So we now have a clear overview of Dilthey's key concerns in terms of his basic methodological stance. 'Only in inner experience, in the facts of consciousness, have I found a secure anchor for my thinking...'.* 'What they (Dilthey has in mind the "Historical School") lacked in their studies and their use of historical phenomena was any recourse to an analysis of the facts of consciousness. So they lacked a justification through what, ultimately, is the only secure knowledge – in brief, they lacked a philosophical foundation'.** From this standpoint, 'our picture of the entire natural world emerges as a mere shadow, projected forth by a reality hidden from us. We possess reality as it is, meanwhile, only through the facts of consciousness given in inner experience'.*** Dilthey aims to bring out 'the total human being', the 'real process of life' in its entirety, by way of these facts of consciousness. With this goal, Dilthey certainly shows himself an opponent of all 'intellectualizing' psychology. But the methodological basis of his foundational work continues to be tied to the cogitationes (res cogitans) and their interpretation as developed and established by Descartes in his Meditations.

Yorck's inclination,8 alive in his engagement with Dilthey's work and key concerns, is particularly evident in his comments on the tasks of analytic psychology as a foundational discipline. Referring to Dilthey's publication for the Academy9 'Ideas Concerning Descriptive and Analytic Psychology' (1894)**** Yorck states that Dilthey 'clearly identifies self-reflection [Selbstbesinnung] as the primary means of acquiring knowledge, and analysis as the primary method of doing so. On this basis, you put forward propositions that are verified by the data you find in yourself. But you do not achieve a critical analysis, an explanation, and therefore intrinsic refutation of constructive psychology and its assumptions' (Briefwechsel, p. 177). '... The fact that you do not provide a critical analysis, i.e. that you do not demonstrate decisively and in detail the relevant psychological origins,10 is connected, I believe, with your conception of epistemology and the status you accord to it' (p. 179f.). 'The explanation for the inapplicability11 – you have clearly identified the fact of this inapplicability itself – can be provided only by an epistemology. It would have to give an account of the adequacy of the scientific

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*Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. I (Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften) [Introduction to the Human Sciences]. Preface, p. XVII.
**Ibid. p. XVI.
***Ibid. p. XVIII.
methods and justify the methodology, instead of lifting the methods from the individual fields – a hit-and-miss affair in my view' (p. 179f.).

In essence, what Yorck is calling for here is a logic that precedes and guides the sciences, as did the logic of Plato and Aristotle. Inherent to this call is the task of bringing out, in a constructive and radical fashion, the categorial structures of that being which is nature and of that being which is history (life). For Yorck, Dilthey's investigations place 'too little emphasis on the generic difference between the ontical and the historical' (p. 191) (author's italics). 'In particular, you lay claim to the technique of comparison as a method for the human sciences. Here I disagree with you.... Comparison is always aesthetic; it is always attached to outward appearance [Gestalt]. Windelband links history to individual figures [Gestalten]. Your concept of type [Typus] is an entirely inward one; it deals with personalities [Charaktere], not individual shapes [Gestalten]. For Windelband history is a gallery of pictures; of individual figures; of aesthetic construction. Of course, all the natural scientist has left, besides science, is a merely aesthetic pleasure: a kind of humane tranquillizer. But your concept of history is that of a nexus of forces, of units of force, to which the category of individual figure should apply in a figurative sense only' (p. 193).

Guided by his firm instinct for the 'difference between the ontical and the historical', Yorck recognizes how tenaciously traditional historiography still clings to 'purely ocular determinations' (p.192) concerned with the corporeal [das Körperliche] and the realm of the individual figure [das Gestalthafte]. 'Ranke is a great oculist; for him, vanished things cannot turn into realities [Wirklichkeiten].... Ranke's entire modus operandi also shows why he limits the historical subject matter to the political. This alone is dramatic' (p. 60). 'I consider the changes wrought by the passing of time insignificant, and here I may hold a view different from yours. I see the so-called Historical School, for example, as no more than one current within the same river, representing just one side of an old and persistent opposition. There is something deceptive about the name. This School was not historical at all, another antiquarian, construing things in aesthetic terms; whereas the great dominant movement was that of mechanical construction. So what this School contributed to the rational method was merely an overall atmosphere' (p.68f.).

'The true philologist is the one who has a concept of historiography as a chest of antiques. Where there is no direct inference, where only living mental transposition takes you – this is somewhere these gentlemen
never reach. For in their heart of hearts they are natural scientists, and they grow even more sceptical because of the lack of experiments. We must steer well clear of all the trivia such as how many times Plato had been to Magna Graecia or Syracuse. There is no vitality in that. A superficial style of this kind, which I have now critically reviewed, eventually arrives at a big question mark, and has come to grief when faced with the great realities of Homer, Plato and the New Testament. Everything truly real becomes a lifeless shadow when viewed as a "thing in itself", when it is not experienced' (p. 61). 'The "scientists" confront the prevailing forces of an age in much the same way as the most sophisticated circles of French society confronted the then revolutionary movement. In both cases there is a formalism, a cult of the form. Comparative methods and ratios are the answer to everything. Of course, this mode of thought, it seems to me, has its own – as yet unwritten – history. This groundless way of thinking and the faith in such thinking is a historical product – from an epistemological standpoint it is a metaphysical posture' (p. 39). 'The ripple effects caused by the eccentric principle, which ushered in a new age more than four hundred years ago, seem to me to have become exceedingly broad and flat; knowledge has advanced to the point of nullifying itself, and man has become so far removed from himself that he no longer catches sight of himself. "Modern man," that is, man since the Renaissance, is fit for the grave" (p. 83).

In contrast, 'all truly vital historiography, which goes beyond the mere portrayal of life, is criticism' (p. 19). 'But knowledge of history is for the most part knowledge of its hidden sources' (p. 109). 'As far as history is concerned, it is not the things that catch your eye and create a spectacle that are of most importance. The nerves are invisible, and this applies to essential things in general. And just as people say, “If you kept quiet, you would be strong.” it is also true to say, “If you are quiet, you will hear, that is, you will understand”’ (p.26). 'I also enjoy the silent soliloquy, as well as communion with the spirit of history. This spirit did not appear to Faust in his study, or even to the great Goethe. The spirit of history would never have frightened them away, no matter how serious and compelling the form taken by it. After all, the spirit of history is a brother and relative in a different, deeper sense than the denizens of bush and field. This endeavour is like Jacob’s wrestling, a sure gain for the wrestler himself. But that is what matters in the first instance’ (p. 133).
Yorck understands clearly the fundamental character of history as ‘virtuality’ because he is aware of the being-structure of human life itself; he does not gain this understanding by adopting an epistemological stance towards the object of historical observation: ‘That the entire psychophysical reality is not something that is (being = the being present of nature; author’s note\textsuperscript{1}), but something that lives, is the taproot of historicity. And the kind of self-reflection directed not towards an abstract I but towards the fullness of my self will inevitably find me historically determined, just as physics recognises me as cosmically determined. In the same way as I am nature, I am also history...’ (p. 71). Seeing through all bogus ‘comparisons and ratios’ and ‘groundless’ relativisms, Yorck did not hesitate to draw the ultimate conclusion from his insight into the historicity of Dasein: ‘On the other hand, however, given the inner historicity of self-consciousness, a systematics divorced from history \textit{[Historie]} is methodologically inadequate. Just as physiology cannot ignore physics, philosophy – particularly a critical philosophy – cannot ignore historicity .... . The conduct of the self and historicity are like breathing and atmospheric pressure. It may sound somewhat paradoxical, but – methodologically speaking – not to historicize philosophy seems to me a metaphysical remnant’ (p. 69).

‘Because to philosophize is to live, so in my view (don’t be alarmed!) there is such a thing as the philosophy of history. Who, I ask you, could write this history? It could certainly not be conceived and attempted in the same old way, as you have argued so unassailably. So far, the wrong question, indeed an impossible question, has been posed. Yet this is not the only question. Hence it also follows that there is no true philosophizing that is not historical. It is intrinsically wrong to separate systematic philosophy from historical accounts’ (p. 251).

‘The potential for practical application is of course the real justification for any science. Yet mathematical \textit{praxis} is not the only kind. In practical terms, our standpoint is pedagogical in intent, in the broadest and deepest sense of the word. It is the soul of all true philosophy and the truth of Plato and Aristotle’ (p. 42f). ‘You know what I think about the idea of ethics as science. Nevertheless, there is always room for improvement. Who are such books for in any case? One registry after another! The only remarkable thing here is the urge to get from physics to ethics’ (p. 73). ‘If one understands philosophy as a manifestation of life, rather than the phlegm of groundless thought – which appears groundless because our attention is turned away from the ground of consciousness – then our
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task is as complicated and arduous to accomplish as it will be brief and succinct in its result. Freedom from prejudice is the prerequisite, and that is difficult enough to accomplish in itself' (p. 250).

It is clear from Yorck's remark about the difficulty of such investigations that he himself set out to grasp the historical, in contrast to the ontical (ocular), through categories, and to understand 'life' with appropriate scientific rigour. He holds that the aesthetic-mechanistic style of thought 'can more easily be expressed in words (because the provenance of so many words lies in the ocular sphere) than an analysis that tries to get behind perception ...'. In contrast, for anything that penetrates to the ground of life, it is impossible to provide an exoteric account, which is why none of the terms here are commonly understandable, but rather unavoidably symbolic. The peculiarity of philosophy's linguistic expression reflects the special nature of philosophical thought' (p. 70f.). 'But you know my fondness for the paradoxical, which I justify by the fact that paradox is a property of truth, and that, as an elementary precipitation of generalizing half-truths, the communis opinio has nothing in common with the truth. Its relationship to truth is like the sulphurous fumes left behind by lightning. Truth is never elemental. One of the state's key pedagogical tasks should be to undermine elemental public opinion and, as far as possible, to educate people to see and observe in an individual way. This would enable the conscience of the individual - conscience, in other words - to come to the fore once again, rather than so-called public conscience - which is the total externalization of conscience' (p. 249f.).

So Dilthey's basic concern includes the task of producing an ontology of 'the historical'. Only through this ontology can the project of 'understanding historicity' succeed. At the same time, Yorck's appreciation of history shows clearly that such an ontology cannot proceed along the path of historiography and its object. The phenomenal basis for this ontology is instead inherent in human Dasein [menschlichen Dasein]. But before examining critically whether the two friends' ontological stance is sufficient to the task of understanding historicity, and if so to what extent, we must lay bare the nature of the being of Dasein [Seinsverfassung des Daseins] by showing positively what the phenomenon of time is.
Chapter 2: The Original Ontological Characteristics of Dasein*

We can sketch out how time is to be made accessible to investigation by recalling two facts:

1. In most everyday things we do and have done to us, human life is geared towards time. It is inherently ordered by time [zeitliche Regelung]. There is a time for work, meals, recreation, and diversion. The ordering [Regelung] of time takes a fixed and public form in calendars, timetables, class schedules, curfews, and the eight-hour work day. Events [Ereignisse] occurring in the world around us [Umwelt] and the processes of the natural world are 'in time'.

2. When human life, in its researching mode, examines time itself in order to find out what it is, it finds itself confronted with the 'soul' ['Seele']

*This investigation takes a phenomenological approach. Phenomenology's first breakthrough came with Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (1900/01). This 'definition' is intended to indicate that phenomenology can be understood only by studying and learning from this foundational text. Yet phenomenology is so far from being a 'method' that we must glean the mode of examination from the things themselves [den Sachen selbst]. The author owes his understanding of this less to the book than to vigorous personal guidance by Husserl. Through regular instruction and by generously allowing the author to view numerous unpublished studies, Husserl introduced the author to the most diverse fields of phenomenological research during his years of apprenticeship [Lehrjahre] in Freiburg.

The awkwardness of the formulations in the following study is due in part to the nature of the investigation. It is one thing to tell stories about entities [Seiendes], but quite another to grasp the being [Sein] of entities. We often lack not only suitable words but above all suitable grammar. Language is primarily a matter of articulating and expressing entities [das Seiende] rather than shedding light on the being [Sein] of such entities.

(i) Plato, Aristotle
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or the ‘mind’ ['Geist']. This leaves one wondering whether these are ‘time’. The two foundational treatises on time that have been handed down to us, apart from the one by Plotinus,* by Aristotle in the fourth book of the Physics and Augustine in the eleventh book of the Confessions, suggest that this is the case. Aristotle writes: εἴ δὲ τὸ μὴ ὀίσθαι εἶναι χρόνον τότε συμβαί
νει ἡμῖν, ὅταν μὴ ὀρίζωμεν μηδεμίαν μεταβολὴν, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ἀ
dιαιρέτω φαίνεται ἡ ψυχή μένειν, ὅταν δὲ ἀοιδήμεθα καὶ ὀρίζωμεν,
tότε φομεν γεγονέναι χρόνον, φανερῶν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ὄνευ κινήσεως καὶ

καὶ γὰρ ἐάν ἡ σκοτός καὶ μηδὲν διὰ τοῦ σάματος πᾶσχαμεν, κι
νεσίς δὲ τις ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἑνή, εὐθὺς ὅμω δοκεῖ τις γεγονέναι καὶ χρό
νοσ.18 l. c. 219 a4–6.

εἴ δὲ μηδὲν ὅλο πέφυκεν ὀριθμέειν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ψυχῆς νως, ὅδ’
nατον εἶναι χρόνον ψυχῆς μὴ οὕσης, ἀλλ’ ἡ τούτῳ ὅ ποτε ὅ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ὅσον εἴ εὐδέχεται κίνησιν εἶναι ὄνευ ψυχῆς.19 l. c. 14, 223
a25–28. Augustine writes: In te, anime meus, tempora metior; noli mihi
obstrepere: quod est, Noli tibi obstrepere turbis affectione tuarum. In
te, inquam, tempora metior; affectionem quam res praeterententes in te
faciunt, et cum illae praeterierint manet, ipsam metior praesentem, non
eas quae praetererunt ut fieret: ipsam metior cum tempora metior.20
(Confessiones lib. XI, ch. 27. n. 36 [Migne P. L. tom. XXXII. 823 sq.]).

These two sources show that time occurs within human Dasein
[menschlichen Dasein] and that Dasein accommodates time. ‘Soul’ and
‘mind’, however, the key reference points for the classical investigations,
constitute the ‘substance’ of human Dasein.

The following investigation follows this twofold lead. The more origi-
narily we probe the ontological characteristics [Seinscharaktere] of human
Dasein, the more we will be able to focus on time. We will find the
foundation for the analysis of time through an ontological description
of human Dasein. In what follows, I shall simply use the term ‘Dasein’ for
‘human Dasein’ ['menschliches Dasein'].**

* Enn. III. Lib. 7. On the theory of time in ancient philosophy, see also Simplicius, Corollarium
** In my earlier essay, ‘The Concept of Time in the Historical Sciences’ ['Der Zeitbegriff in der
Geschichtswissenschaft', now published in Gesamtausgabe. Bd 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann, 1978), pp. 413–33]), in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik,
vol. 161 (1916), p. 173ff. (Habilitationsvorslesung, 1915), I overlooked the critical survey
of more recent theories of time by v. M. Frischeisen-Kohler. See Jahrbücher der Philosophie, I
(1913) p. 129ff. Two further publications have now appeared: Georg Simmel, ‘Das Problem der
historischen Zeit’ [The Problem of Historical Time] in Philosophische Vorträge published by the
The following ontological interpretation of Dasein does not claim to be the final word on Dasein. The aim is to get at Dasein's fundamental structures in order to shed light on time. Any investigation of this kind will come up against the phenomenon of time sooner or later.

The following analysis lays bare Dasein's basic characteristic [Grundcharakter]. Dasein means: being in the world. This phenomenological finding entails three elements: 1. 'in the world'; 2. beings [Seiende] that are in the world; 3. being-in [In-sein] as such. Dasein is to be understood here phenomenologically in its 'ordinary state' [seinem Zunächst], something that is always disregarded because it seems self-evident [Selbstverständlichkeit]. This first take on the phenomenal stock of ontological characteristics provides us with a sufficient basis for an interpretation of Dasein as care [Sorgen] and as a being that exists in a state of possibility [Sein in der Möglichkeit].

1. Dasein means: being in a world. The world is the wherein [das Worin] of such being. 'Being-in-the-world' has the character of concern [Charakter des Besorgens]. The world, (2) 'wherein' the being of Dasein is, is that 'with which' ['das Womit'] Dasein deals in concerned fashion [besorgenden Umgangs]. The concern [das Besorgende] which this being is rather than has, is oneself [man selbst]. Explicitly or implicitly, authentically

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Kantgesellschaft, no. 12) 1916, and Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes [The Decline of the West], vol. I, chapter 2. Spengler adopts Bergson's theory of time, which distributes, formally and dialectically, temps and durée among the categories of quantity and quality.


/being there with

being in 1 (doing – tending to [pflegen]: With-World?)
↓
of the world
being together with one another! [Miteinandersein!]

(2) that which sur-rounds [das Um-hafte]

'place' ['Ort']
distance – nearness
directions
changeability
(changing oneself through concern)
still without rendering present [Gegenwärtigen] and presence [Anwesenheit]
but also to be distinguished –
surrounding world – as encountered in time
and opened-up by it
in [chapter] II
from there in [chapter] III historical world and
'happening' – (movement)
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[eigentlich] or inauthentically [uneigentlich], Dasein is always my own [das meine]. Dasein as such is always engaged in one of its possible ways of dealing with the world in concerned fashion. The most familiar forms of this are working on or with something, arranging something, producing something, taking something into use, keeping something safe [in Verwahrung halten], allowing something to become obsolete [in Verlust geraten lassen], scouting out, looking at, initiating, undertaking, finishing, and giving up. The corresponding resting, idly whiling away one's time [untätige Verweilen] and taking leisure are of the same stock of concerned dealing with the world.

We encounter the world through such concerned dealing with it. Engaged being-in-the-world is, as such, opened-up [erschlossen] to the world. Dasein, as the opened-up state of ‘being-in’, is the condition for encountering the world. The being of this condition is, among other things, determined by the being of Dasein. Certain specific ways of encountering are evident in the reality of the ordinary world that we deal with [Sein der nächstänwesenden Umgangswelt].

Concern that stays within its particular vicinity encounters the things of the world [das Weltliche] (that which is present in the world) as ‘useful for’, ‘of importance to’ and ‘favourable to’. They are thus encountered in their places (or not). For instance, the tool hanging in its place indicates [Verweisung] the place where it is used. Here, the yet to be completed work, for which the tool is useful, is present [vorhanden]. As we go about our work, a surrounding context is co-given in the shape, for instance, of the axe that we find in its place: house, yard, forest, trees to be felled, wood to be chopped, storage room, firewood, preparation of meals, kitchen, and household.

This area [Umkreis] where worldly things are present [weltlich Anwesenden] has its fixed orientation and own spatiality. The sites and places of work are articulated in the well-trodden pathways taken in pursuit of our concerned engagement [des Besorgens]. The ‘where’ tells us ‘right next to the staircase’, ‘at the edge of the forest’, ‘alongside the stream’, ‘across the clearing’. The surrounding space [Umweltraum] has nothing in common with homogenous space and related measurements. We encounter this space in the ‘places’ of worldly things [weltlichen Sachen] and along the paths we take when running errands [Besorgen].

The milieu [Umgebung] in which concerned engagement abides is characterized by familiarity [Vertrautheit]. Concerned engagement comes up against that which has ‘always already been there [Da] in such and
such a way'. And it is only in the context of what is thus encountered that something unexpected may get in the way as an obstacle, disruption, or incident. The 'there' of this unfamiliar something that we encounter as we deal with the world stands out so much precisely because what we encounter in the world around us on a daily basis is characterized by inconspicuous familiarity (is taken for granted). This unfamiliar something is part of the 'there' of the world we deal with, something that suddenly occurs, that happens by chance, the 'last thing you were expecting' in any particular situation. This disturbed familiarity reinforces what is self-evidently 'there' [das selbstverständliche Da] as something unobtrusively pre-given.

Efforts to determine the most common and most genuine ontological characteristics of the world we deal with [Umgangswelt] tend to skip over the well-worn self-evidence of the world as object of our concern [Besorgungswelt]. From the outset, such efforts get lost in contrived conceptions of an object's reality as the correlate of some discrete, abstract act of perception. But by avoiding this mistake, which cannot be remedied by subsequently endowing the objective thing with values, we open up the possibility of encountering the ordinary surrounding world [Umwelt]. And this we can do by elaborating the ontology of everyday 'being-in-the-world'.

Apart from familiarity, the surrounding world exhibits the ontological characteristics of apperence [Vorschein] and presentness [Vorhandenheit]. These emerge as structural elements of the basic character of the 'world', of significance [Bedeutsamkeit]. We started our investigation with a look at something that is encountered within the surrounding world and its character as 'useful for'. But the way in which the tool in its place is ordinarily present is anchored in the very thing it points towards [verweist] in its usefulness. What it points towards, the link with its surroundings [Umgebung] in line with the abovementioned spatiality, which is articulated in our concerned dealing with the world, is present in the mode of the 'already there in advance' [Vorweg schon da]. We find ourselves [befindet] always already within particular surroundings [Umgebung], however broad or narrow they may be, and it is in these surroundings [Umgebung] that those things we encounter usually [zunächst Begegnende] emerge in their apperence [Vorschein]. The always already present surroundings [Umgebung] inherently, and indeed inconspicuously, mould the things around us [das Umweltliche] into the characteristic mode in which we encounter them [charakteristische Begegnungsart].
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What we usually encounter [Das Nächstbegegnende] is ready-to-hand [zuhanden] in and through the 'for the sake of this' or 'for the sake of that' that we encounter along with it. The 'what for' or 'to what end' contains within it further significations and references [Verweisungszusammenhänge] within which concerned engagement [Besorgen] finds its bearings. The orientation built into the 'from - to' of the sites and pathways used in our dealings with the world [Umgang] constitutes the 'surrounding'-ness [das 'Um'-hafte] of the world. In the shape of a house and yard for example, this always already present 'surrounding'-ness encompasses within it the 'upon what' and 'where' of the 'estate' ['Anwesens']: land, field, forest, mountain, and stream, all of which are under the heavens. We encounter this surrounding world [Umwelt] of the everyday things present-at-hand [alltäglich Vorhandenen] – namely in the light of day (or its absence) – in the same manner that we encounter the world of concern [Besorgungswelt]. This surrounding world exists in the shape of contexts that our concern reckons with (what is present [Anwesenheit], the course and setting of the sun, the phases of the moon, the weather), that from which we protect ourselves (house-building), what we utilize, what we manufacture things from (timber, ore), and our means of business and transport (water, wind). Nature [die Natur] is encountered through the kind of concern that is directed at harnessing and utilizing. Nature is favourable or unfavourable, but as such it is in fact not dependent on our ordinary concern. That the surrounding natural world [Umweltnatur] 'is-always-already-there' is evident in the fact that there is no need to create it [Herstellungsunbedürftigkeit]. But the presence [Anwesenheit] of 'nature' also comes to apparency [Vorschein], according to its most robust presentness [realsten Vorhandenheit], in the shape of the characteristic significations opened-up by our concerned engagement; it is not primarily the object of scientific-theoretical understanding.

So apparency means that what we ordinarily encounter emerges from the already existing, familiar, surrounding-ness [Umhafte] of the world, though its presence [Praesenz] is not accentuated. The mode of being of what we encounter ordinarily, constituted by apparency, is being ready-to-hand [das Zuhandensein]. That which remains familiar to us in a state of calm concerned engagement, as something ready-to-hand, is available [verfügbar]. It is only through availability, understood in this sense, that the character of presentness [Vorhandensein], which implicitly undergirds apparency [Vorschein], comes into view.

<23>
CHAPTER 2: THE ORIGINAL ONTOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DASEIN

The surrounding world – when examined with regard to its presence [Anwesenheit] – is structured according to its own significations and references. Concerned engagement dwells in this context, although it does not recognize it as such. But it does know its way around its surrounding world. This acquaintance with our own particular surrounding area, by which concerned engagement guides itself, adheres to the significations that are encountered. We are beginning to get a clearer idea of what was indicated by apparency: what concerned being-in-the-world ordinarily dwells upon are not discrete, occurring things, but rather the significations [Verweisungen] – the ‘from here – to there’ within the context of concerned ‘in order to’. Therefore it is in these significations that the original ontological structure of the encountered world lies. These significations are the way in which the encounter with the world shows itself. Significations (something is useful for, of importance to, produced from) is a ‘signifying about’, in the sense that what the signification is about, ‘the signified’ [Be-deutete], is itself to be found in the signifying. This signifying signification is originally directed at concerned engagement with the world [besorgenden Umgang].

Concerned being-in-the-world has opened-up its world relative to this possibility to encounter it. As concern, it has entrusted itself to the guidance of the surrounding world. Signification is the way in which we encounter the surrounding world. When we are concernfully immersed in the world [besorgende Aufgehen], as well as when we lose ourselves in it, we allow ourselves, as it were, to be carried along by these significations. So we have now identified the basic character of encountering the world – signification [Bedeutsamkeit].

Hence ‘signifying’ does not mean that natural objects, having previously been there as mere object-like things, are then endowed by a subject with value properties that are not truly characteristic of these entities. On the contrary, we identify signification as the world’s primary ontological characteristic [primären Seinscharakters der Welt] in order to provide a basis on which to show that the ontological characteristics of the natural world [Seinscharaktere des Naturseins] have a specific origin. We can only fully explicate signification by producing a well-founded ontological exposition of Dasein’s being that clarifies the following: a) why ontological research initially skipped over signification and has continued to do so; b) why signification is still seen as requiring explication and derivation, even though an ersatz phenomenon [Ersatzphänomen] in the form of the natural object with added-on value properties has been put
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forward; c) why signification is explained through its dissolution in some antecedent reality; d) why this foundational reality is sought in the being of natural objects. So far, our aim in explicating the ontological character of the world has been to provide an initial ontological account of Dasein, calling it clearly to mind and shaking up our view of Dasein with regard to its fundamental character of ‘being-in-the-world’.

2. As ‘being-in-the-world’, Dasein is at the same time being together with others [miteinandersein]. The aim here is not to assert that mostly we do not exist as single persons, that others are also present. Rather, ‘being together with others’ implies an ontological characteristic of Dasein that is equiprimordial with ‘being-in-the-world’. This aspect of Dasein persists even if no one else is actually spoken to or perceived. Since ‘being together with others’ is equiprimordial with the fundamental characteristic of Dasein as ‘being-in-the-world’, we must be able to read off the ordinary ‘being there’ ['Da'] of others (with whom we live in the world) from the manner in which we encounter the surrounding world (as described above). The table over there, with its particular seating arrangements, entails a reference to those whom we dine with on a daily basis; the tool we encounter when we use it was bought at –, mended by –; we received the book from –; the umbrella in the corner was left behind by –. We encounter the things we are concerned with in our dealings with the surrounding world as something that should appear in such and such a light before others, be useful to them, excite, or outdo them. The surrounding world lets us encounter others we are acquainted or familiar with. Others are always already present as those with whom we have to do in our concern whenever concern deals with something in the surrounding world.

But it is not just others that we encounter in this way. We also encounter ourselves [man selbst] in what we do, what we expect, prevent, in the concerns with which we are ongoingly preoccupied. And this encounter with oneself [Sichselbstbegegnen] through the surrounding world occurs in the absence of any egological self-observation or reflection of ‘inner’ experiences and acts. Ordinarily and for the most part, and as encountered in the world, the others are there [da] as the with-world [Mitwelt], while one’s self is there as the self-world [Selbstwelt]. In the most common mode of being there [im nächsten Dasein] one is the world of others and, in this world of others, one is one’s own world. This equiprimordial with-worldly and self-worldly articulation must be
understood as worldly in light of the primary character of encountering the world – significance. This must be done in such a way that the ‘with’ aspect is thrown into relief relative to the ‘surround’ aspect on the basis of significance.

‘Others’ are already there in what particular significations of the surrounding world refer us to. The bridge under construction refers to such and such people; the boat on the beach refers to the person to whom it belongs. In no way can we now designate what is co-encountered [mitbegegnet] in the surrounding world (bridge, boat) and what is there as the ‘upon which’ of the significations as something that is ‘good for this’ or ‘good for that’, or made of certain materials. Rather, it is something that itself deals with [umgeht] what it encounters [dem Begegnenden]. Whatever others deal with and where they abide: that is the surrounding worldliness [das Umweltliche]. Within the surrounding world we encounter concerned engagement, and through this – and, usually, through it alone – we encounter others. Even our ‘direct’ encounter with others happens within the context of the surrounding world. We encounter others working in a room, in the street, on the way to or from work, while they are busy running errands [besorgend], or simply hanging around doing nothing [bummelnd im Nichtstun].

The surrounding world lets the ‘being-in-it’ of others be there through the primary ontological mode of concern; others and their ‘being-in’ are encountered by my ‘being-in-the-world’. This encounter – which occurs ordinarily and for the most part via the surrounding world – is the having-to-do-with-each-other, the being-dependent-on-each-other, or the having-nothing-to-do-with-each-other; it is reckoning with or counting on others. The ‘with’ of others, which is already present in the state of concerned ‘being-in-the-world’, may take the form of being for or against each other or going along together indifferently. Even when we use others as an instrument, the signification [Verweisung] is such that, by reckoning with these others, we encounter the signification in terms of concern [als besorgend begegnet].

The ordinary already-there-ness of others [Das nächste Schon-da-sein der anderen] in that with which they are concerned comes into particular focus when the primary ontological character of the world is understood in terms of significance. The world in which we meet one another is not an occurring context of natural things, but the world where we abide, occupied with something. The answer to the question of who, ordinarily and for the most part, Dasein is was provided implicitly in the foregoing
explication. The term ‘one’ [‘man’] is well-suited to the phenomenal facts about ordinary Dasein and allows us to answer the question of ‘Who’? One is concerned with, one does something, one enjoys, one sees, one evaluates, one asks questions. One exists in the ordinary surrounding world of being together with one another.

Being-together-with-one-another means: encountering one another in the surrounding world with which we are jointly concerned [miteinander besorgten Umwelt]. There are many kinds of encountering, but within certain limits ‘others’ are always familiar and intelligible. Their being-in is opened up to one’s own being-in-the-world and vice versa. In pursuing his usual concerns, each person is for the most part what he does. He does not own himself [sich nicht zu eigen] – he is inauthentic [uneigentlich]. Ordinarily, in the context of everyday life with others, everyone is equally inauthentic. ‘One’ is opened up to the other in this inauthentic state. We do not start off with self-contained ‘subjects’, so to speak, who must then build bridges to one another.* This assumption does the original ontological structure of Dasein as little justice as the notion that the world is brought to Dasein, as it were, ‘from outside’ such that Dasein first has to place itself in the world and can reach it only through a transcending act of cognition.

with a characteristic of Dasein: the tendency to take things lightly \([Leichtnehmen]\) and to make things easy \([Leichtmachen]\). This is why the public realm holds sway so intractably. Each person is 'the others', no one is himself. 'One' is 'nobody', the nobody to which everyday Dasein voluntarily surrenders.

The 'one' which every Dasein is becomes even clearer if we bring out a primary ontological mode of the public realm: language. But in order to do so, language, in all its phenomenal reality, must be brought back into Dasein, as a way of Dasein's being.

To speak is to talk about something, in such a way that what we are talking about \([das Worüber]\) is co-revealed as we speak. As a theoretical act, knowing is only one and not even an original manner of revealing. To 'talk about' something means to say something about something. But talk that says something is speaking to and with others. And, as a mode of speech, talking about something with others is to talk things out and to say what is on one's mind \([Sichaussprechen]\). Oneself, that is, a given being-in-the-world, is co-revealed as one speaks. These two equally primordial characteristics show speaking to be a fundamental way of being-together-with-each-other-in-the-world.

Listening-to-one-another is part and parcel of speaking in the fullest sense. Being-there \([Dasein]\) in the mode of talking-with-one-another means: to listen to (to belong to)\(^1\) one another. This \(belongingness\) also characterises the sense of being-together-with-one-another.

The recording of tones or the registering of sounds proves to be an abstract, artificially constructed and extreme variation on primary hearing and understanding one another in the sense of listening-to-each-other. The latter implies to respond to and comply with others \([Folge leisten]\) as we pursue our concerns in the surrounding world; taking care jointly with others \([mitbesorgen]\). In the first instance, hearing someone talk is never the perception of tones that are subsequently endowed with meaning. Even when talk is unclear or a language unknown, one does not initially hear mere sounds, but incomprehensible words. To be a speaking being \([Sprechendsein]\), to be determined in one's being primarily by language, is to be capable of talking. This opens up the possibility of keeping silent. It is only when our being resides in the capacity to talk that we can genuinely keep silent.

The phrases 'to say nothing about something' (to let something pass), 'to tell someone off', 'to be easy (or difficult) to talk to' and 'to say to oneself' indicate the ordinary, everyday ontological mode of
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language. Accordingly, it is not primarily geared towards the communication of theoretical knowledge [Erkenntnisvermittlung]. But at the same time we must avoid interpreting language merely as a means of exchanging or communicating views for practical, technical purposes. Talking-with-one-another is in fact the fundamental way of being-together-with-one-another-in-the-world. Talking something over, talking someone into or out of ‘something’ – has the character of immersing [des Aufgehens] oneself with others in what is talked about [im Besprochenen].

What is emphatically present [ausdrücklich gegenwärtig] is the cared-for surrounding world [besorgte Umwelt] in all its significations as that which we talk about when we are concerned, not the talkers, let alone the talk itself. Others are there only by way of what is ‘under discussion’; they listen and give accounts. For the most part, in everyday talk the equiprimordial ontological characteristics of language that we have highlighted are not equally explicit. It is in fact an ontological characteristic of Dasein that some features (talking ‘to’ and talking things out and speaking one’s mind) are hidden and take a back seat while others (the subject matter of talk, what it is about) stand out.*

The fact that speakers are immersed in what they are talking about does not in itself ensure that they appropriate the things under discussion in an original way. In everyday life, we talk without originally appropriating what the talk is ‘about’. What we say about something – the said [das Gesagte] – is said on the basis of hearsay (the newspaper), parroted [nachgeredet], picked up from our reading; and it is ‘said without thinking’ ['daher geredet'] in this rootless fashion. When we are together with others and go about our business [besorgenden Umgang], our talk (colloquial speech) [die Umgangssprache] is characterised by uprooted inauthenticity [entwurzelten Uneigentlichkeit]. That which was originally articulated at a specific point in time circulates in the surrounding world; from what he has heard, the parroter understands enough for everyday life, without first subjecting it to thorough examination [Auseinandersetzung]. And what he in turn tells others gives rise to what we call idle talk [Gerede].

It is in idle talk, as a specific ontological mode of language in everyday life, that ‘one’ ordinarily and most genuinely resides. It is idle talk – through which the most common being-together-with-one-another is lived and directed – that facilitates the intractable domination of ‘one’. ‘One’ inherently implies ‘nobody’. Talk of this kind is distinguished by the lack of any

* Cf. below, p. 41 [German pagination].
original appropriation of what it is 'about,' and through so-called verbal thinking [Wortdenken], which has surrendered to the power of certain verbal phrases [Wortbegriffe], it may also pervade and govern the treatment of problems within scientific disciplines [Wissenschaft]. In chugging along in language – because language is a fundamental way of being-in-the-world – uprooted Dasein secures a reputation and legitimacy for itself through the public realm of the 'one'. We encounter the vagueness and vacuity of meanings, which are not in fact grasped as meanings, in the way everyday talk pursues its themes. This impoverished ontological structure of the said and the talk that is governed by it must not prompt us to view language as a matter of tone or sound in the first instance. The vagueness of meaning is a specific quality, namely the routinized intelligibility of well-worn everyday talk. Because language constitutes a basic way of being-in-the-world, this talk is a specific way of dwelling in the world.

If we accept the original fact [Tatbestand] of being-in-the-world as the ground for the interpretation of language, and if we understand talk and its possibilities in light of Dasein's possible ways of being, we can evaluate the validity of the various answers to questions concerning the 'essence' of language. Interpretations of language as a symbol, as an expression of what we experience and cognize, as the conveying of 'lived experiences', as communication, and as articulation, all base their respective claims on phenomenological features of language, but fail to appropriate and explicate these features accordingly. That language is communication is clear when we look at Dasein's most ordinary mode of being. But communication must not be understood here as the imparting of knowledge – the transportation, as it were, of insights out of one subject and into another. Communication, as talking something over with one another, is the form in which, together with others, 'one' 'shares' ['teilt'22] and has the cared-about world. To have the world means to be concernfully immersed in it. Communication means to bring others, and oneself together with others, into such being-in-the-world and to dwell in it.* We may look upon communication of this sort as communion with others [Teilnahme].

*That the Greeks' pre-scientific interpretation of Dasein could locate man's being in the ability to talk: ἀνθρωπός = ζώον λόγον ἔχων springs from the experience of everyday Dasein, in particular the Greek one. The later animal rationale = rational living being [vernünftiges Lebewesen] conceals the state of affairs originally experienced. Again, the fact that the Greeks pushed the investigation of language towards a logically determined grammar is due to their particular way of being in the world through speech [sprechenden In-der-Welt-Seins].
3. So far, by highlighting the fundamental character of 'being-in-the-world', we have brought two things to light: first, the 'world' as that with which we are concerned as we go about our business, and second, 'one' as the being [Sein] of Dasein in its concernful, ordinary everyday life. Here, we were also inevitably addressing 'being-in' ['Insein'] as such, but not for what it is in itself. We alluded to it in our references to concern. But only by explicating the ontological characteristic of 'being-in' itself can we get to Dasein's original ontological constitution [Seinsverfassung].

In terms of its basic structure, we can identify being [Sein] as care [Sorge]. Taking care of or being concerned about something [Besorgen] emerges as the most usual and common mode of this being [nächste Seinsweise]. 'Being-in' amounts to 'being at' the world we are concerned with. 'Being at' takes the form of familiarity with the world, encountered all of a piece as the surrounding-, with-, and self-world. Familiarity includes trusting the world and submitting to it without suspicion as we arrange, cultivate, harness, and keep things at our disposal. Counting-on-the-world includes knowing one's way around in it. Due to its informed counting-on-the-world, ordinary being-in is 'at home' in the world. The 'in' of 'being-in' means this being 'at home', in line with the primary sense of 'surround' ['Um'] explicated earlier and the original spatiality [ursprünglichen Räumlichkeit] inherent in it.*

'Being-in' secures for itself the leeway – at first and for the most part narrowly circumscribed – for an unthreatened state of abiding [Verweilen], within which it may confidently pursue its concerns. In knowing its way around, it secures for itself a clear frame of reference. Defined in this way, 'being at' ['Sein bei'] constitutes the possibility of encountering the world [Begegnenlassen der Welt]. The possibility of encountering the world is not just any old property of Dasein, one it could do without. This ontological characteristic of 'being-in' means keeping the world in an opened-up state within certain limits [jeweiliig umgrenzten Erschlossenheit]. As such, being-in-the-world is 'opening-up' ['erschliessen']. But this is not done in the sense of theoretical understanding. Such understanding rests on a prior opening-up of the world.

*See Jacob Grimm. Kleinere Schriften, vol. VII (1884), p. 247ff. for 'in' ['in'] and 'bei' ['at']. Accordingly, 'in' comes from innan = wohnen [to dwell], habitare; ann = I am accustomed to, I cultivate; the Latin colo = habito and diligo. There is also a connection between 'bin' ['am'] and 'bei' ['at']: I am = I dwell. [Colo = to cultivate, till, tend, to take care of; habito = to inhabit, dwell; diligens = attentive, careful. Heidegger incorporated much of this footnote into the text of Being and Time (GA 2,73). –Translator's note.]
Concerned ‘being-in’ implies Dasein’s being-dependent-upon the world. Right from the start, this being-dependent-upon has already opened up the world with regard to its ‘in order to’ [‘um-zu’]. For example, one primarily encounters wood ‘in order to’ make a fire, build a boat, and so on. Encountered in terms of this ‘in order to’, the wood ‘is’ too hard, too soft, too damp, too heavy. It is considered to be this or that with respect to its greater or lesser degree of usability. As being-dependent-upon, Dasein follows such significations [Verweisungen] within the surrounding world, taking its lead from them as it goes about its tasks, calculations, and so on. The world’s tendency to change, which is the basis of the availability or unavailability of things and processes in the surrounding world, becomes accessible through calculation [Berechnung]. The appropriation [Aneignung] and preservation [Verwahrung] of the opened-up world takes place in Dasein, whose ability to talk defines it as that which addresses [Ansprechen] and discusses [Besprechen] the encountered world. This takes the form of speaking about something as something. In this, the ‘in order to’ becomes highlighted in all its diverse signification [Verweisungsmannigfaltigkeit]. Talking things over in this way is entirely free of the focus on ascertaining states of affairs through mere observation. As yet, its sole function is to open up and comprehend the surrounding world. When it talks things over in this appropriating fashion, ‘being-in’ expresses itself, provides itself with orientation. By addressing the surrounding world, being-in talks things out, expresses itself, and thus builds up an accessible fund of insight.

The concerned opening-up that is characteristic of Dasein, i.e., primary knowing [primäre Erkennen], is called interpretation [Auslegung]. Even those things whose ‘in order to’ is yet to be revealed and which have therefore not yet been appropriated in terms of their ‘as-such’ are addressed by way of interpretation. The strange is not something merely present-at-hand [Vorhandenes] and, as such, the subject of assertions. Rather, we are initially at a loss as to what to do with it. So it is something we encounter within the context of concerned opening-up, and the question of what it might be is an interpretive one about what-it-is-good-for [Wozu]. The responding interpretation [auslegende Antwort] indicates a signification (suitable for – hindrance to); the formerly strange enters the intelligible, familiar sphere of concerned engagement [besorgenden Umgang]. So knowing one’s way around [Sichauskennen] means to have at one’s disposal what is interpreted [Ausgelegtheit] in a given case, as limited by the sphere of one’s concerned engagement. Because ‘being-in’
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is defined as being-together-with-one-another, what is interpreted is confirmed by the corroboration of others; this corroboration is anchored in the repetitiveness of Dasein's day-to-day engagement with the world [täglichen Umgangs].

But in identifying being-in as abiding [Aufenthalt] 'in' the world, in the sense that it is dependent upon the world that it interprets, we have not fully conveyed its character, let alone described it in an originary sense. Being-in is based on how one finds oneself [Sichbefinden] in any given situation, as is indicated by the notion of discursive interpretation [besprechende Auslegen] as talking things out and expressing oneself [Sichaussprechen]. We must understand that our being dependent upon the opened-up world implies at the same time that we are affected by the world [Angegangensein von ihr], by its helpful or threatening features.

Our concerned engagement with the world may take the form of undisturbed doing, quiet using or indifferently getting-on with something. Such an indifferent condition in which one finds oneself constitutes just one ordinary mode of Dasein's everyday life. It can just as often and just as easily be replaced by restlessness, excitement, fear or hope. So being-in finds itself in a state of cheerful elation or in a discordant, downcast condition. The character of one's condition or how one oneself feels — and this is the most immediate and originary character — lets being-in be 'there' for itself. That being-in is 'there' for itself emerges as a basic characteristic of Dasein: the state one finds oneself in [Befindlichkeit]. In this state, Dasein is opened up to itself — always in accordance with its particular being-in-the-world.

In the ordinariness of engagement with the world [Im Zunächst des Umgangs] one encounters the self in what 'one' does. In particular, the self is there in 'how one feels' when one is doing what one is doing. The state one finds oneself in [Befindlichkeit] is neither a matter of inner lived experiences that one has gone through, nor should we interpret it as theoretical understanding. But the last thing this suggests is an impairment of the state one finds oneself in in terms of its capacity to uncover things [Aufdeckungsleistung] through one's mood [Gestimmtsein]. It holds Dasein's particular situation [Lage] in its entirety in the there [im Da]. In this, Dasein's transparency to itself is variable. This transparency is always completely different from that of theoretical knowledge and must not be measured against the self-evidence of such knowledge. The state one finds oneself in is not a case of 'intending something' in the sense
of a theoretical act of understanding. And it lacks entirely the systematic character inherent in 'intending something'. The state one finds oneself in is the particular position or opportunity [Gelegenheit] of the situation [Lage] of being-in. It renders explicit the there 'in which' Dasein finds itself.

That the being which we call Dasein is its there [Da] also means that Dasein is the ontic possibility [seinsmäßige Möglichkeit] of the world having been opened-up. The two phenomenal facts about Dasein – (1) that it is its 'there' and (2) that it allows the encounter with the opened-up world (that it itself therefore has the character of being-in) – reveal a further basic aspect of Dasein: discoverture [Entdecktheit].

Only now do we have a full grasp of being-in. The natural meaning of 'being at home' is not that one occurs in one's home, as lying around in the manner of tools. Nor does it mean that one has the knowledge that one is at home, in the sense of a report to oneself that one exists in such a fashion. What it means is that one feels at home. Being-in refers to that being [Sein] in which Dasein finds itself [sich befindet] as a particular form of concerned abiding [besorgenden Verweilens].

What one thinks of as affects [Affekte] classified as a second or third class of experiences and faculties and associated with cognitive or conative behaviour, or else interpreted as 'sentiments about something', must be understood via discoverture [Entdecktheit] as the state one finds oneself in [Befindlichkeit]. When analysing affects [Analyse der Affekte] our primary and consistent source of direction must come from our exploration of Dasein with respect to its being.

However, we must approach discoverture – alluded to here initially solely by reference to being-in – as an ontological characteristic of Dasein, namely with respect to the everyday reality of Dasein.

To the extent that discoverture is a basic ontological constitution of Dasein, it must have been part of our earlier investigations. It is just that we did not interpret it as such. The phenomenon of the public realm described above is discoverture's everyday mode of being. The public realm regulates, invisibly and doggedly, the entitlements and needs of being-together-with-one-another-in-the-world. Its power comes from idle talk, which speaks about the world in an average fashion. In such talk, Dasein expresses itself. But we are in a position now to understand idle talk as the way in which interpretation is preserved [Verwahrungsart der Auslegung]. In idle talk interpretation becomes free-floating; it belongs to everyone and comes from nobody. In idle talk interpretation hardens into interpretedness [Ausgelegtheit].
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Dasein, which 'has come into the world' through birth, grows up in and grows into such interpretedness. This interpretedness entails a self-interpretation of Dasein. It delineates 'what is appropriate', 'how to behave', 'what one has to do in particular situations'. Participation in interpretedness, by making known what one is saying and what one is talking about, amounts to joining in with [Mitmachen] the mood [Gestimmtheit] generated by the particular way in which the world affects one [im jeweiligen Angegangenwerden von der Welt]. Inscribed in the public realm are instructions [Anweisung] for encountering the world in a particular way. The public realm also holds the key to a certain typical state in which Dasein finds itself [üblichen Befindlichkeit des Daseins]. The characteristic of the public being-in and the public state in which one finds oneself [öffentlichen Befindlichkeit] point to the most common mode of discoverture's being.

As idle talk is the way in which interpretation is preserved, it retains the latter's basic structure. Interpretation means to address something as something in a state of concerned engagement. In terms of its meaning and intention, talking things out opens things up interpretatively. That which is said and that which is parroted back convey interpretations. Parroting involves speaking sentences and understanding them in a commensurate average sense. This releases parroting from any need to re-examine what it is talking about. What has been said is considered sufficient, despite the fact that whatever is being discussed may be quite different in reality or may have changed.

But this uprooted reality of the said [bodenlose Gesagtsein] is enough to distort [verkehren] the work of interpretation and the specific self-interpretation inherent in it (the facilitation of discoverture [Entdecktheit]). Because interpretation puts something forward 'as such and such a thing', it is possible that communication about beings in the ontic shape of idle talk – simply by parroting the said – conceals [verdecken] what it purports to lay bare. Deceptive intentions are not necessarily at play here, that is, passing one thing off as another. Baseless parroting is after all shared communication [mitteilend]. The said disseminates a certain view in such a way that the public realm becomes set on it, and this governs all further discussion and questioning from the outset.

Idle talk conceals simply because of its characteristic failure to address things in an originary way [ursprünglichen Ansprechens]. It obscures the true appearance of the world and the events in it by instituting a dominant view [herrschende Ansicht]. In line with its mode of domination within the everyday reality of Dasein, idle talk extends even to seemingly
genuine questions and investigations, thus keeping Dasein from engaging in original interpretation and examination [Auseinandersetzung]. So what purports to be an opening up of the world is in fact its concealment: by appealing to public opinion and tradition, idle talk creates in Dasein the belief that it possesses universally acknowledged and thus genuine truths. Interpretation is the appropriation and development of being-in. Usually and for the most part, the ontic mode of being-in (discovery) is concealment [Verdeckung]. Interpretedness, which is speech encrusted by idle talk, draws any given Dasein into 'one's' way of being. But existence in the 'one' now entails the concealment and marginalization of the genuine self [eigentlichen Selbst]. Not only has each particular Dasein given itself over to 'one', 'one' blocks Dasein's access to the state it finds itself in [Befindlichkeit].

In the public realm – which is the ordinary way of being of discovery – Dasein lives neither in an originally appropriated world, nor does it exist as itself. But it is only because Dasein has the basic structure of discovery (being-in, founded on the state in which one finds oneself) that it can cultivate concealing.

Interpreting is primary knowing. When we interpret, we appropriate the surrounding world of our concern (being opened-up) in terms of its significations. Knowing is a basic way of being-in. As such, it is present in speaking and the state in which one finds oneself [Befindlichkeit]. All perceiving (seeing, hearing) is interpretative. Dasein gains its sight from its interpretative perceiving and orientation. But because of its primacy in perceiving, sight is understood in a wider sense. Circumspection [Umsicht], the sight of concerned engagement, ensures that being-in has opened up the world closest at hand. Circumspect as it is, concern sets the course for its undertakings and projects and determines the means, right opportunity and appropriate timing [geeignete Zeit] for every task it takes on. Even in cases where the encountered world (for instance, the heavens) is not subject to productive or utilizing schemes, it is reckoned with by concern in the form of circumspective looking at. The sun and moon are included in circumspection in calendars, as are stars in navigation.

Having a rest [Ausruhen] is a way of being of concern [Besorgens]. If concern is idling when one takes a break from a task at hand, it nonetheless remains a being-in. If one abandons what one is working on, one's circumspection becomes merely looking around, abiding in. When one takes a break, concerned being-in pulls back from its concentration.
on the circumspectively determined situation and its demands. Seeing, hitherto bound up with circumspection, is now set free to simply discern [Wahrnehmen] and have-present [Da-haben] the world. This state of whiling away one's time [das Verweilen] finds its diversions in the world. In this concerned looking-around, the care [Sorge] inherent to curiosity (curiositas, cura)* becomes self-sufficient [eigenständig].

Initially, looking around while whiling away one's time merely constitutes a modification of circumspection. Opened-up through circumspection, the world is always already there to be looked at. Only now, concerned being-in no longer follows the cues of the 'in-order-to' to complete tasks, but merely looks at the world encountered in these cues (significance) with respect to the 'as-what'. Curiously looking around does not remain with what is already familiar through circumspection. Going beyond the horizon of the everyday, curiosity opens up that which is as yet foreign and new. This it does in such a way that it is unable to remain with what has now become accessible. Instead, it uses the latter only to create further opportunities to experience new things.

Curiosity's immersion [Aufgehen] in the appearance [erleben] of the world is here revealed [enthüllt] as allowing-oneself-to-be-carried-along by the world [Sichmitnehmenlassen von ihr]. Already firmly secured and unencumbered by urgency or want [Not], curiosity enters into what is in fact the risk-free, noncommittal care [Sorge] of excitement [Aufregung].

*For curiositas as cupiditas experiendi (concupiscientia oculorum) and the primacy of sight, see Augustine: Ad oculos enim proprie videre videtur. Utimur autem hoc verbo etiam in caeteris sensibus, cum eos ad cognoscendum intendimus. Neque enim dicimus, Audiquid rutilet; aut, Olfac quam niteat; aut Gusta quam splendeat; aut, Palpa quam fulgeat: videre enim dicuntur haec omnia. Dicimus autem non solem, Vide quid luceat, quod soli oculi sentire possunt; sed etiam, Vide quid sonet; vide quid sonet; vide quid oleat; vide quid sapiat; vide quam durum sit. Ideoque generalis experiens sensuum concupiscientia, sicut dictum est, oculorum vocatur: quia vivendi officium in quo primatum oculi tenet, etiam caeteri sensus sibi de similitudine usurpant. Cum aliquid cognitionis explorant. Confessions X, ch. 35. 1.c.802 sq. English Translation by F. J. Sheed, Augustine: Confessions. Books I-XIII (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), p. 200: 'For "to see" belongs as a property to the eyes; yet we apply the word also to the other senses, when we use them for gaining knowledge. Thus we do not say: "Hear how it flashes," or "Smell how bright it is." or "Taste how it shines," or "Touch how it glows": because all these things are said to be seen. Yet we do say not only "See how it shines," something that only the eyes can perceive; but also "See how it sounds," "See how it smells," "See how it tastes," "See how hot it is." Thus the experience of the senses as a whole, as has been said, is called the lust of the eyes. Because though the function of seeing belongs properly to the eyes, yet we apply it to the other senses by analogy when they are in pursuit of the truth about anything.'
Influenced by curiosity and letting itself be carried along by the world, being-in is *everywhere and nowhere*. This abode-less whiling away in the world is characteristic of diversion [*Zerstreuung*] as a manner of Dasein’s being. Dasein becomes increasingly bogged down as a result of the inquisitive concern [*neugierige Besorgen*] of looking for the sake of looking and having looked. Every question it poses and every interpretation it comes up with is shaped by this entanglement. Even when Dasein talks about itself, it speaks the language of the world, having lost itself in the appearance of the world. So in curiosity Dasein is on the run [*Flucht*] from itself. In curiosity, Dasein closes itself off from possible situations of critical confrontation [*Auseinandersetzung*], commitment, doing one’s best to achieve something, and decision-making [*Wahl*]. During this flight from itself, Dasein takes shelter in idle talk. Public opinion prescribes and sanctions ‘what one must have seen and read’. It breeds new yearnings of the ‘eyes [*Bedürfnisse des Sehens*] and invents commensurate ways of satisfying them. Under cover of public opinion, curiosity serves to conceal more than ever.

Yet insofar as curiosity always opens up the world to some extent, the now accessible appearance of the world may serve as the basis for an investigative look [*untersuchendes Hinsehen*] at things. It is in such looking-into-things that the potential for pursuing research [*Forschung*] lies. Research isolates a field of investigation within the opened-up world; this particular field is marked out as a subject area [*Sachgebiet*]. Research is a specific way of being-in-the-world. If scientific knowledge is primarily understood as a possibility of existence [*Seinsmöglichkeit*] of Dasein itself, it can never – if it is to become genuine [*Eigentlichkeit*] – fall to Dasein as a self-evident possession. Instead, faced with the risk of concealment inherent in the public realm and the dominance of conventional interpretedness, Dasein must always and in each case appropriate the right opportunities for original experience through critique.

In the *sciences* [*Wissenschaften*], Dasein’s discoverture has turned the spotlight on itself. The sciences emerge within Dasein’s ordinary interpretedness and fall back into it – in their findings. That which was formerly opened up in original fashion is now preserved in fixed concepts and propositions. Freely floating, truths become ‘valid propositions’ [*‘Gültigkeiten’*]. Possession of universal truths [*Allgemeingültigkeiten*] removes the need [*Bedürfnislosigkeit*] to go back and scrutinize the original, foundational contexts of being [*Seinszusammenhänge*]. The prevailing conviction as to the validity of propositions serves as a substitute for
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repeating those experiences that open up and appropriate a given topic in the first place. Historically, public interpretedness has tyrannised the sciences too. Free-floating, valid propositions form the point of departure for new theories, which keep alive an ever-changing cycle of questions and potential questions – the problems as such – with which one is concerned.

The tendency to conceal inherent in the traditional interpretedness of Dasein lies in Dasein’s own, most common mode of being [Seinsart]. Insofar as Dasein develops research projects by endeavouring to interpret itself, these research projects – as ways of Dasein’s being [Seinsweisen] – are all the more dominated by interpretedness and concealment. Intellectual history [Geistesgeschichte] and philosophy are ways of research concerned more or less explicitly with the topic of Dasein.

An age may lay claim to ‘historical consciousness’ as its distinct opportunity for its self-interpretation. This leads it to scrutinize the most distant and exotic of cultures in all their apparent diversity. This process of being ‘carried along’ by ‘world’-history, a process in which nothing is off limits, makes its mark and assumes its possessions by constructing typologies and registers of types. But the way in which an age views the past is also the criterion for the kind of appreciation [Betrachtungsweise] of which it deems itself worthy of. The present [Gegenwart] itself is subject to classifying, comparative typification. Through its systematic and dialectical approach, philosophy lays [besorgt] the foundation for possible attempts to order and typify cultural formations, values and the domains of reason [Vernunftregionen]. Nothing is spared typification. Subsumption under a type lets knowledge achieve its goal. This knowledge, concerned with expressions of life, Gestalt, and systematicity, actually reflects a curiosity that is hidden from itself. (This assertion is not meant as an evaluation, let alone a disparaging one; it is solely intended to bring out the kind of being of this knowledge as a way of being-in.)

While the interpretation of ‘humanity’ ['Humanität'] is the task and goal of the aforementioned research strategies, the subject matter itself – Dasein with respect to its being – is left entirely unexamined, or is examined only occasionally within the framework of a fixed systematics, or in light of a reified definition of the human being (animal rationale). Where Dasein is subject to investigation as in the ‘philosophy of life’ (which is about as meaningful a term as ‘botany of flowers’ and serves a merely propaedeutic function in case this self-evident truth has been forgotten), the research is concerned chiefly with the great variety of
ways in which life may be expressed in different cultures. However, to
the extent that one is concerned with life itself with respect to its being
and as ‘being’, the interpretations are informed by a sense of being
[Sinnes von Sein] drawn from the being of the world [Sein der Welt] or the
characteristics of the world [Weltnatur]. Consequently, the sense of being
[Sinn von Sein] rests in the indifference of a verbal concept [Wortbegriff]
that is ‘taken for granted’ and left unexamined. The experiences Dasein
has on the basis of its being and the highlighting of this being, in other
words the development of an ontology appropriate to this entity [diesem
Seienden], is suppressed by the concealed dominance of a reified Greek
ontology handed down by traditional interpretations, but just as much by
the obligatory questions [Fragezwang] of ossified disciplines.

So it is by looking at the most pronounced examples of Dasein’s
autonomous self-interpretation that we can lay bare Dasein’s discov­
erture in light of its tendency for concealment [Verdeckungstendenz].

Public opinion [Öffentlichkeit] and curiosity [Neugier] are modes of
discoverture [Entdecktheit] brought about by the being of Dasein itself in
the shape of everydayness. The explication of this being-in – the flight
from itself through the concealment of itself – must clarify Dasein’s
basic constitution in a much more originary way. To be in the world
means to be dependent upon it. The ontological characteristic of concern
[Besorgen] is immersion in the surrounding world of our concern.
Concern [Besorgen] encompasses circumspect execution of a task as much
as passing one’s time while looking around, both of which occur in both
a calm, carefree state [Sorglosigkeit], and a state of anxiety [Besorgnis]. To
the extent that, qua being, Dasein ensures that it is carried along by the
world [Sichmitnehmenlassen von der Welt], being-in is characterised by the
inclination [Hang] to immerse itself [Aufgehen] in the world. Dasein falls
away [Abfallen] from itself when it falls under the spell of the world [Verfallen
an die Welt], causing being-in to fall apart [Zerfall] and collapse into the
public realm; being-in is levelled down to ‘one’ and vanishes into it.
Falling under the spell of the world (being-in in the form of its inclination
to fall) is not an event that merely happens to Dasein or an ‘accident’
that happens to it from time to time. This inclination is the ontic undoing
[seinsmässige Verhängnis] endured by Dasein as being-in-the-world.

Drawing on its own world, Dasein provides itself with possible ways
of making things easy for itself through idealization [idealisierendes
Sichleichtnehmens], thus failing to achieve itself [Sichverfehlens]. In terms
of its own being, falling under the spell of the world is seductive [versucherisch].
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As such, it holds being-in firmly in its fallen state [Verfallenheit]. Dasein’s self-interpretation conceives of Dasein as rising to the level of its possible, ideal deeds [Wirkungsmöglichkeiten]; this guarantees Dasein the certainty [Sicherheit] and incontestability [Unfragwürdigkeit] of its being. So the seductive process of falling under the spell of the world is a reassuring one. Having reassured it, this process drives Dasein towards its alienation [Entfremdung]. Through its immersion in and rising from the world Dasein is reassured. Thus Dasein becomes convinced that it most likely comes face to face with itself through the world and world history. The concern that is directed towards the world and which becomes caught up in its own worries [Besorgnis] blocks Dasein’s possible route back to itself.

Yet in the specific forms it takes (seducing, reassuring, alienating) the process of falling reveals that Dasein is an entity [Seiendes] that, in terms of its being-in, is concerned with being itself [dem es in seinem Insein um das Sein selbst geht]. As concerned being-in – and particularly in fleeing from itself – Dasein has made its being [Sein] something that it cares about [Sorge].

But if, falling under the spell of the world, being-in is concerned [besorgt] about its being, this falling concern [verfallendes Besorgen] must rest on Dasein’s being threatened [Bedrohtsein]. But this being threatened, which drives each Dasein into its world, cannot come from the world. It must lie in the being of Dasein itself. The possibility for this is given in Dasein’s basic constitution, its discouverture. Dasein is being-in that finds itself in a given state. In its fallen state, being-in obtains [besorgt] the familiarity and reassurance of ‘being-at home’. The falling ‘away from … to …’ is the flight from not being ‘at home’ – from unhomeliness or uncanniness [Unheimlichkeit]. In any given case, the uncanny [unheimlich] is only that which ‘affects’ [’angeht’] being-in as such. Yet the world of our concern [besorgte Welt] and the self-world [Selbstwelt] encountered in it – oneself – are that which is familiar and what one is acquainted with.

When in the dark, in other words in the absence of light as the precondition for sight, or if one is alone, one can have an uncanny feeling in a familiar environment. As a result of the absence of light or of other people we are overcome by an uncanny feeling in the most familiar of settings where one used to feel at home. And one is no longer at home. The characteristic state one finds oneself in [Befindlichkeitscharakter] when no-longer-being-at-home is anxiety.* When the anxiety has

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CHAPTER 2: THE ORIGINAL ONTOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DASEIN

passed, one says: it was really nothing [nichts]. Language accurately reflects the phenomenon here. Anxiety is the state in which one finds oneself in the face of nothing [Nichts]. This nothing is not the subject matter of theoretical speculation; it must instead be understood as that phenomenon in the face of which [Woher] one is anxious. Even the phrase ‘in the face of which’ robs anxiety of its characteristic ‘nothingness’ [‘Nichts-Charakter’]. The state of one’s feeling uncanny is a privative mode of being [Seinsart], the flip-side of ‘feeling at home’, in other words a possible way of being [Seinsweise] of being-in. It is possible for Dasein to cope with its anxiety. Existing in the face of nothing [Sein vor dem Nichts], in a state of anxiety about itself, a state that provides no basis for immersion in the world, Dasein may be directed back to itself [lässt es sich auf sich selbst verweisen]. This process of being directed back to being-in as such clarifies the ontological structure of being-in in a striking way: ‘that it is the case that it is, and that it is not the case that it is not, and that it itself is the there [Da] where the world can be encountered’.

As long as ‘one’ is the subject of being [Subjekt des Sein], such being-in has nothing more to fear within the familiar, secure, average, public everydayness together with others. This ‘nothing more’ is precisely the nothing [das Nichts] of uncanniness uncovered by anxiety as the state one finds oneself in [Sichbefinden]. In falling under the spell of the world and being dispersed into it through diversions [Als sich zerstreuendes Verfallen an die Welt], Dasein fends off its own uncanniness, in line with its first and foremost mode of being. Discoverture’s authentic way of being [eigentliche Seinsweise] is uncanniness [Unheimlichkeit], while the most common everyday mode of discoverture is concealment [Verdeckung]. So the discoverture of being-in is the ontic condition for the possibility [seinsmässige Bedingung der Möglichkeit] of a fallen state [Verfallenseins], which can in turn trigger anxiety as the state one finds oneself in [Sichbefinden] vis-à-vis uncanniness.

It is precisely in the flight from itself that the being of Dasein lies. We must not conflate this ‘that it is’ – the fact that it itself is its there [Da] – with the naked presence [nackten Vorhandensein] of the world. The presence of the world can be encountered in the there; it may be identified as the there. A given Dasein, however, cannot itself be such a presence. On the contrary, it is its ownmost characteristic ‘that it is’ in the ontological mode of finding itself in this state [Befindlichkeit] and the possibilities that lie in it. Let us call this presence, possessed by each individual Dasein – one is it, or I am it – facticity [Fakticität]. Facticity is in
turn the ontic condition for the possibility of addressing Dasein in worldly terms \[weltlich\] as something present \[vorhanden\], though only in the sense of abstractly and mindlessly registering that something is present.

Ordinarily, Dasein is immersed in its world, and it lives in the ‘one’. In other words it \textit{can} be inauthentic \[uneigentlich\]; it can allow itself to be determined by the world, and it can also choose various modes of concern within a given surrounding world. Dasein can lose itself in the world and thereby go astray; but it can also choose itself \[sich selbst wählen\] and decide to subject every concern \[Besorgen\] to an original choice \[ursprüngliche Wahl\]. In fact, insofar as Dasein is characterised by this ‘I can’, its ordinary being-in is revealed as ‘being in possibility’ \[‘Möglichsein’\]. What it is – whether authentically or inauthentically – is always what it \textit{can be}. This basic constitution of Dasein will become clearer in what follows.

We have characterised Dasein as concern \[Besorgen\]. As it is concerned about the world, Dasein is concerned about its own being in the world. Dasein is always after something, something it has placed under the remit of its care \[in die Sorge gestellt hat\]. In contrast to the entities that exist in the surrounding- and with-world and that are objects of concern with regard to their presence or non-presence, we shall use the term \textit{care} \[Sorge\] for the being of entities \[Seienden\] that exist in the mode of concern. The following chapter reveals the extent to which care, as Dasein’s basic structure, determines its ways of being \[Seinsweisen\].*

*The author grasped that care is the basic character of Dasein while studying the ontological foundations of Augustine’s anthropology. The significance of this phenomenon in the interpretative history of Dasein has now been clarified by the research of K. Burdach (cf. this journal \(\text{Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte}\), vol. 1, 1923, p.1ff. \(\text{Faust und die Sorge}\)). The self-interpretation of Dasein quickly comes up against this phenomenon (ibid., 41ff.).

\(^{11}\)

(I) Quote Hygin!
Chapter 3: Dasein and Temporality*

But is the interpretation of being [Seinsinterpretation] we have advanced so far really adequate? Do we not face an insurmountable obstacle in attempting to investigate Dasein in this way, an obstacle that is in fact co-present as a constitutive element of the subject matter itself, namely the being of this entity [Sein des Seienden](I), [i.e. Dasein]?

*I presented a few of the ideas found in the following chapter in a lecture given at the theological faculty of Marburg University in June 1924. The introduction was as follows:

'The following reflections deal with time. "What is time?" you ask. If time finds its meaning in eternity, it is from this angle that we must approach it. This prefigures our point of departure and sets the course for our investigation into time: we must proceed from eternity to time. This approach is acceptable on one condition, namely that we know eternity and adequately comprehend it. Yet if eternity means something other than empty perpetuity (et), if God is eternity, it follows that the approach to time suggested above must remain in an awkward predicament for as long as it knows nothing of God. And if faith leads to God and the relation to eternity is nothing other than this faith, philosophy will never reach eternity and hence will never be able to make methodological use of such a perspective in the discussion of time. In the context of these questions, then, the theologian is the true expert [rechte Sachkenner] on time. This is because, first of all, the theologian treats of human Dasein in its being before God, that is, being in time in its relation to eternity. Second, Christian faith stands in relation to something that happened in time, indeed, a time of which it is said that it was 'fulfilled'. By contrast, philosophy is left with the sole option of comprehending time through time'.

(I) understand

(II) of course, the fact that, along with many other basic concepts, theological dogmatics initially borrows the concepts of time and eternity from philosophy – though it is still an open question whether the kind of philosophy chosen haphazardly by theologians in line with their particular tastes has gained an adequate [sachgemäss] understanding of these concepts – only heightens the notorious confusion surrounding these concepts. The new ‘approach’ in protestant theology never positively grasped what Luther demanded so vigorously in his Heidelberg Disputation, and which, moreover, has thus far never been put into practice. Since then there have been repeated relapses – cf. modification of Melanchthon’s Loci – into philosophy, cf. Hermann, Kultur der Gegenwart [Contemporary Culture]. Basic science [Grundwissenschaft], employing the concept of soul, contra Hegel in its intention – but following him in its basic outline.

(III) provided it understands itself as research with respect to the range of questions it may explore

*IInsofar as the intention here is to bring out a fundamental structure, there is need for careful consideration of methodology, which is also of relevance to the analysis put forward in [Chapter] I
THE CONCEPT OF TIME

As being-in-the-world, Dasein is always my own [das meinige], whether explicitly or not, authentically or inauthentically. It is as impossible to omit Dasein’s being-in as it is to omit its while-ness\(^1\) [Jeweiligkeit]\(^28\) (as a specific characteristic of its being-in). As care [Sorgen], this entity, which in each case [jeweilig] is oneself, remains forever on its way to something [unterwegs zu]. Dasein’s being is intent on [Aus-sein auf] that which it has not yet become but is able to become. But how can this entity then serve as an adequate basis for analysis in the sense of an identifiable, informing whole if it has not yet reached a state of completion? Only when it is what it can become will we be able to grasp it as a whole.\(^2\)

Only in its having-come-to-an-end is it there\(^3\) in its entirety.\(^4\) But of course in being-finished [Fertig-sein], it has in fact ceased to be. Hence the difficulty in the ontological interpretation of this entity is due not to ‘the irrationality of lived experiences’, let alone the limitations and uncertainty of knowledge, but to the being of the entity at issue itself.

We would be ill-advised to base our investigation on the Dasein of others that has come to an end and is present as a finished whole. First of all, it is central to this Dasein that it too is no longer ‘there’ ['da'] as itself. But above all, the particular Dasein of others can never be substituted for\(^5\) the being of Dasein, as long as we wish to maintain that Dasein is in each case one’s own [jeweilig das meinige].\(^6\) I can never be the Dasein

\(^{1}\) formal concept
\(^{2}\) Dasein – as a whole – constitution of wholeness
wholeness not as a completed accumulation of characteristics but as
an existential [Existential]
gleaning the wholeness from the existing entity itself [dem Seienden selbst] –
through which it is whole in its being
wholeness / not as the condition of a possibility (?)
but the How of being [des Seins]
thus also authentic [eigentlich], inauthentic [uneigentlich]
this existential at the same time as phenomenological fore-conception [Vorhabe].

\(^{3}\) as something that exists, it must be ‘there’ in its entirety
in order to delineate its wholeness.

\(^{4}\) having come to an end, finished = at an end –
being whole, it is no longer wholeness
but death as a characteristic of the characterised entity – Dasein

\(^{5}\) being substituted for something
which means – there is indifference within certain limits
but no one can substitute for death. my death

\(^{6}\) not in the least bit applicable here
of others, although I may be together with them. (Being in the ‘one’ is possible only as loss, or as not yet having attained authentic wholeness [eigentliche Jeweiligkeit]). This way out posits Dasein as a whole that one encounters in the world and is supposedly ‘finished’. But is not the proper approach, which is missing from this way out, already abandoned in the question? Indeed, this is one reason why, when considering the problem of our full access to the whole of Dasein we ordinarily understand the end [das Ende] as a moment that completes a formation process [Gestaltung] or breaks off a sequence of experiences and events, and brings all activity to a close, as a result of which this entity is no longer ‘there’. In both cases, Dasein is assumed in advance to be something worldly [Weltliches] and is scrutinized with regard to what is present [Vorhandensein] or not present [Nichtvorhandensein] relative to something still to come. Ill-suited to the ontological reality [Seinsbestand] of this entity – an entity that is never something present-at-hand [Vorhandensein] – this mode of questioning obviously clashes with this reality.

From a propaedeutic point of view, however, this mode of questioning shows that we must not understand Dasein’s death* as some process

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*Those acquainted with the kind of anthropology developed within Christian theology know that, from Paul to Calvin’s ‘meditatio future vitae’, this anthropology took death into account in its interpretation of life. In contemporary ‘philosophy of life’, following Dilthey’s precedent, G. Simmel has included the phenomenon of death in the definition of life. See Lebensanschauung. Vier metaphysische Kapitel [View of Life Four Metaphysical Chapters], 1918. p. 99–153. K. Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen [Psychology of World-Views], 2nd edition, 1922. p. 229ff may be fruitfully compared with the present study, as Jaspers identifies the category of the ‘limit situation’, which is of key importance to an
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happening to Dasein.\(^{1(1)}\) As an ontological characteristic of Dasein, death – which is in each case one’s own – must be determined with regard to the manner of Dasein’s being, namely as ‘what is in store for Dasein’. ‘Death’ as such does not exist. Death is always my own death.\(^{(2)}\) Whiling away its time, Dasein is in each case its own death [Das Dasein ist in seiner Jeweilsigkeit je sein Tod]. Dasein means to exist in possibility [Möglichsein]. Its death is the ultimate\(^{(3)}\) [äusserstes] possibility for Dasein. Within the ways of being we have explicated, each particular Dasein is this – its – ultimate possibility.\(^{(4)}\)

Our task is to delineate the ways in which Dasein can be its ultimate possibility. For if the ontological characteristic of death\(^{(5)}\) indicated above applies, the everydayness of Dasein must be revealed as one of the ways in which each Dasein lives its death. Concerned being-in-the-world is co-concerned with the being of Dasein [Mitbesorgen des Seins des Daseins]. As being-in, it practises interpretation. It expresses itself in the shape of the ‘one’ of public opinion: ‘one will surely die at some point, but meanwhile ...’ The death of others is an almost daily occurrence that ‘one’ talks about.\(^{(6)}\) Death may also come to ‘one’. The statement ‘one dies’ allows death to emerge as a possibility, although in such a way that death, as a possibility that is in each case one’s own, is concurrently pushed aside. Concerned immersion in the world is indifferent to death. Such immersion ensures that we forget death.\(^{(7)}\)

\(^{1(1)}\)Dilthey, essay on Goethe.
\(^{(1)}\)provided that Dasein is adequately determined in light of the characteristics analysed.
\(^{(2)}\)determining wholeness.
\(^{(3)}\)‘ultimate’ – the ‘in-the-end’ or the crucial aspect of being-there [Da-sein] as ‘no longer there’
\(^{(4)}\)Dasein – through discovertoure – determined – ontological characteristics [Seinscharaktere] are existentialia [Existenzialien] –
\(^{(5)}\)death – namely mine does not occur somewhere – such that I meet it in the moment of dying – but it is approaching – I am approaching myself through this ultimate possibility – I am ahead of myself, coming face to face with myself.
\(^{(6)}\)Death and historicity.
\(^{(7)}\)not-expecting as modification of expecting
fleeing from.
We indicated that the state of fallen being-in is 'reassuring'. This state is satisfied with the interpretation: it's not my time to go yet [vorläufig kommt er [der Tod] wohl noch nicht].\(^{(1)}\) So this interpretation validates the urgency driving our immersion in the world. In letting itself be entirely carried away by the world, Dasein pushes its possible death out of sight. In pushing aside death one manifests [besorgt]\(^{(2)}\) an ontological characteristic of this ultimate possibility from the perspective of concerned falling [besorgenden Verfalls]. In its coming, death is entirely indeterminate, albeit certain. Concern covers up this indeterminacy with what it still intends to do. This indeterminacy comes to be defined in worldly terms through the 'it is not my time to go yet'. The disquietude to which this indeterminacy might give rise is kept at bay.

We have seen that reassuring falling is at the same time alienating. The specific worldly form of death's indeterminate coming also obscures a second ontological characteristic of the ultimate possibility of Dasein: the certainty of death. The inexorable nature of certain death cannot openly show itself when Dasein is in a state of self-induced tranquility. ‘One’ talks oneself out of thinking of death. This can happen to such an extent that in contexts of being-together-with-one-another one will even talk the dying person into believing he will soon recover. And the average, worldly self-understanding thinks that this sort of thing consoles the other.

The same public interpretedness belittles 'thoughts of death' as cowardly fear, as a morose flight from the world.\(^{(3)}\) This avoidance of the possibility of looming, certain death presents itself as life-affirming, as self-assurance [Selbstsicherheit]. But despite this masking repose before death, the everydayness of Dasein lives constantly in the face of its ultimate possibility. The tranquillizing and alienating interpretation of death, coupled with the concomitant state of indifference [Befindlichkeit der Gleichgültigkeit] towards death in which one finds oneself, lets the basic ontological characteristic of death appear: the certainty of death, which as such remains indeterminate. But because the state of finding oneself before death and interpretedness of death [Befindlichkeit und

\(^{(1)}\)an interpretation and mode of being of myself.
\(^{(2)}\)passed off as caring about death [Sorge um den Tod]
at the same time concern for being [Mitbesorgen des Seins]
\(^{(3)}\)Courage to fear death.
Ausgelegtheit des Todes] make up the basic constitution of being-in, everyday Dasein is its death in the ontological mode [Seinsart] of fleeing from it.

Dasein's facticity [Faktizität] is characterized by this possibility of death. Hence the ontological interpretation of Dasein will fashion its most originary mode of access to its topic, gleaned from the thing itself [aus der Sache selbst], if it principally conceives Dasein in light of the ultimate possibility of its existence. What is at first an insurmountable obstacle to fully adequate ontological research into Dasein – the fact that this entity never achieves a state of final completion – in fact contains within it a hint of how best to access the fundamental constitution [Grundverfassungen] of this entity. This points us in the direction of 'the thing itself' ['zur Sache selbst'], provided we understand being-continually-unfinished [ständige Unfertigkeit] as well as being-finished [Fertigsein] as nothing [das Nichts] in the sense of being that we already encountered in our preceding analyses of Dasein. If one avoids both Dasein's seemingly ordinary experience of being [scheinbar nächste Seinserfahrung] as well as the interpretation of Dasein as a worldly thing or process present-at-hand [weltlichen Vorhandensein], death is revealed as Dasein’s most fundamental ontological constitution [die ursprünglichste Seinsverfassung]. In any given case, facticity [Faktizität] is itself its own ultimate possibility.(1)

We have now provided an adequate foundation for our interpretation of time. In staking out and delineating this foundation, our investigation adhered to the tendency which, since its decisive beginning in Aristotle, has been inherent to the traditional interpretation of time. But is time in Dasein?

If we wish to remain on a secure footing in our explication of time as a phenomenon found within Dasein itself, we must focus our attention [sachgebenden Blick] on Dasein as it exists in its ultimate possibility. We have already brought out the way in which Dasein lives its death in everyday contexts. But this is the ontological mode [Seinsweise] of falling [Verfallens]. While this mode is constitutive of facticity [Faktizität], it

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(1) what is it
to live one's own particular death as authentic Dasein –
to be futural [Zukünftigsein] –
time
but time is future.
shows Dasein itself to be merely something that can immerse itself in the 'one'. This 'can' (of Dasein) as such is something Dasein can also authentically be. Consequently, only facticity [Fakticität], understood in light of its possible authenticity, can reveal the facts [Tatbestände] of the phenomenon of time, provided that time is in Dasein.

Dasein's ultimate possibility [äusserste Möglicheit] looms before it as a possibility [Möglichkeit]. If Dasein is to realize authentically its ownmost possibility [Möglichsein], Dasein must seize its this possibility in its looming character. Existing in possibility, Dasein must hold on to and endure the looming character of this possibility. Only in this way can possibility live up to its name. So Dasein will run ahead [vorlaufen] towards its looming possibility. This running ahead is the mode of being through which Dasein is authentically its ultimate possibility. As a mode of Dasein's being, running ahead is characterised by the state one finds oneself in [Befindlichkeit] and interpretation. So what we must analyse is how Dasein can genuinely live with this ultimate possibility, and the way in which running ahead, as an interpretative process, uncovers this possibility and can keep it in a state of discoverture. We must first cast light on running ahead as interpretation.

Running ahead towards the ultimate possibility reveals the pastness [das Vorbei] of being-in-the-world, the possible 'no-longer-there'. There is no remaining within the world of concerned engagement. The world loses the chance to determine being-in in terms of what it deals with in its everyday concerns. By itself the world can no longer endow Dasein with being. What provides Dasein with a secure footing as distance and difference from others – who are there as the with-world and as the public realm – disappears when the world fades into the background [Zurücktreten der Welt]. The world recedes, as it were, from the contexts in

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1. Both being seized [Ergriffensein] as authentic discoverture [Entdecktheit] and the state one finds oneself in [Befindlichkeit] as ontological structures.
2. bring Dasein into play here as fully explicated so far.
3. Being towards – as being-ahead-of-oneself in
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which it is encountered in terms of its significance and becomes merely present-at-hand [Vorhandensein].

So being-in is directed to a state in which it finds [Befindlichkeit] that ‘nothing whatsoever’ can affect it [angehen kann], that is, its being before nothing [Sein vor dem Nichts]\(^1\). This nothing, as that which Dasein is faced with, throws Dasein’s being back solely on to itself. This ownmost ‘it itself’ will no longer be ‘there’ in the world. This ‘pastness’ ['Vorbei'], which is in each case one’s own, pulls Dasein back from its lostness [Verlorenheit] in the public averageness of ‘one’. ‘One’ can no longer be the ‘one’, one can no longer have others replace or choose in lieu of oneself. ‘One’s’ capacity to cover things up disintegrates. Flight into the irresponsibility of ‘nobody’ is cut off.\(^2\) ‘Pastness’ reveals the ultimate possibility that Dasein – in dying – has to be [sein muss], purely as itself.\(^3\)

Through its ultimate possibility Dasein is handed over to itself, in other words it becomes manifest that, if it wants to be what it is authentically,\(^4\) Dasein must exist of its own accord [von ihm selbst her sein muss]\(^5\).

Existing in the form of possibility [als Möglichssein], Dasein has the ability to choose. Running ahead – by uncovering what is in each case one’s own

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\(^1\) The nothing of the indeterminacy concerning an entity – not the whether and not the how no one has ever come back – and you are – are we (?) from a world.

\(^2\) passing the buck to some else

\(^3\) as something which it can be conscience and the ‘how’

\(^4\) guilt

the how – i.e. primacy of being of its own accord – in its state of potential ontic completeness.

the structure of the how the being which I am – which one is – in each case in a particular way.

the basic way on the basis of completeness and selfhood [Selbstheit]: ‘I in my entirety’ the ‘how’ as seized. ‘Authenticity’ in nothing other than everydayness – the manner in which one does things whom one stands by and so on

Manner

Basic manner and structure of care time

How

the how of being that is, the being of Dasein authentically

\(^5\) whom
pastness [eigene Vorbei] – confronts Dasein with the choice [Wahl], which, as an opportunity [Möglichkeit], defines the authenticity of Dasein's being [Eigentlichkeit seines Seins]. To say that running ahead confronts Dasein with its choice means: it uncovers the scope of this choice, that which may be chosen: Dasein in the form of its ownmost possibility: either to be itself through the 'How' of assuming its self-responsibility [Selbstverantwortung], or to be in the form of being lived by whatever it happens to be occupied with.

Dasein can choose for its being the 'How' of wanting-to-be-accountable-to-itself [Sich-selbst-verantwortlich-sein-wollens]. So the way in which one inhabits one's engagement with the 'What' ['Was'] of one's particular concerns is determined by the How [Wie] one has chosen. In its facticity, Dasein is constituted equally by this state of possibility in the form of an ability to choose the How and by its fallingness. That which carries along one's being-in in the shape of the surrounding-, with-, and self-world lets one forget the How of engaged immersion. To the extent that falling concern [verfallende Besorgen] is a mode of being, we may also refer to this as the 'falling How' ['verfallende Wie']. As habituation and routine, this How always takes shape with a view to the 'what' of concern. Terminologically, the How per se [das Wie schlechthin] means being-in-the-world, insofar as this is characterised by 'wanting-to-have-a-conscience' ['Gewissen-haben-wollen'].

But, one might think, in order to experience this how and what as the scope of Dasein's authentic choice [eigentlichen Wahl], one is not required to run ahead towards the ultimate possibility. Dasein may become aware of these possibilities of being [Seinsmöglichkeiten] in any given situation. It is possible for the 'How' to present itself as an option without 'one' having to think about death. This view betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the 'How' as a characteristic of being while also failing to grasp the task of the present analysis. The argument that 'there is' such a thing as a difference between the How and the What not only fails to genuinely explicate the How, understood as a mode of being rooted in a specific entity (Dasein); it is in fact a false interpretation, if it engenders the view that there is such a thing as the How as such [das Wie überhaupt]. Furthermore, our analysis is to lay bare running ahead in its genuine being, that is, as that being which resides in pastness as full possibility [im Vorbei als voller Möglichkeit] in its indeterminate certainty. This authentically seized pastness [Vorbei] reveals the range of choices clearly for the first time and thus reveals the How in its determinate form as an ontological characteristic of Dasein.

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11 Dasein's wholeness
Running ahead is the authentic ultimate possibility if it seizes this possibility as a certain one. The certainty of 'pastness' does not refer\(^1\) to the undeniable reality of an entity that is present in the world \(\text{[weltlich Vorhandenen]}\) or is no-longer-present \(\text{[Nicht-mehr-vorhandenseins]}\). This possibility is not a subject matter for factual knowledge \(\text{[konstatierenden Kenntnisnahme]}\)\(^2\). The more such knowledge merely establishes something, the more it must conceal pastness. The certainty of pastness must be certain to Dasein in its ownmost being \(\text{[eigensten Seins]}\) as it runs ahead. But the being of Dasein is characterised by the state in which it finds itself \(\text{[Sichbefinden]}\). Since the certainty of death remains indeterminate, it follows that in 'finding-oneself-in-this-certainty' one must allow oneself to be affected by \(\text{[angehen lassen]}\)\(^3\) indeterminacy as such. One's ownmost pastness \(\text{[Vorbei]}\) is constantly, at every moment, indeterminate. But this means it is certain at every moment. Indeterminacy does not have to conceal certainty; it does not weaken the possibility of pastness.

Running ahead becomes authentic certainty through choosing the 'How,' which is explorative and interpretative, and through having made this choice. The How is manifest as itself in what one has seized upon \(\text{[das Ergriffene]}\) at every moment \(\text{[Augenblick]}\)\(^4\). This state of having chosen the How gives running ahead the character of resolve \(\text{[Entschlosssensein]}\)\(^5\). Running ahead does not open up the What of the

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\(^1\) evidence of something present \(\text{[Anwesenheit]}\)

\(^2\) relating to theoretical or calculated evidence

\(^3\) a state of being \(\text{[Seinsverhältnis]}\)

\(^4\) the concept of the moment \(\text{[Augenblick]}\)

\(^5\) responsibility

I make myself historical \(\text{[Ich mache mich geschichtlich]}\)

assume my heritage \(\text{[Herkunft]}\) - from and towards the future
world to concerned engagement, but rather develops Dasein's authentic discoverture \[eigentlichen Entdecktheit\], namely its resolve \[Entschlossenheit\].

Failure to run-ahead towards the ultimate possibility, lack \[Ausbleiben\]\(^1\) of decision, is itself a way of being Dasein \[Seinsweise des Daseins\] and not nothing. For even when Dasein does not run ahead, it nevertheless remains what it is in all its facticity: falling dependence on the world. And every delay in making the\(^2\) decision is, ontologically speaking, a case of abandoning oneself to the fallen state. Conversely, running ahead towards the ultimate possibility is not dying, but living. It is in this rather than in dying that the burden \[Schwere\] of Dasein lies.\(^3\) When one runs ahead towards death, in each case one's own, death does not become the subject of inquisitive speculation. Running ahead, through which Dasein wrests itself free from succumbing to the world \[Verfallensein an die Welt\], cannot be regarded as a gloomy flight from the world.\(^4\) All flight from the world actually conceals the facticity of being-in. Rather than leading Dasein towards the authenticity and originality of its own being, it tries to transpose it into a 'better world'.

As discoverture, resolve persists within the corresponding state in which one finds oneself, namely sober anxiety \[entsprechenden Befindlichkeit der niichternen Angst\].\(^5\) This means enduring in the face of the uncanniness of one's ownmost being as a being in the form of possibility.\(^6\)

But how do we get from this Dasein, which we have explicated in terms of its authentic existence in the form of possibility, to time? We are already there. Time has been the object of constant consideration in the present study. By describing the ontological characteristic of the being of explorative running ahead, we have already laid bare the phenomenon of time in terms of its genuine being. Each Dasein is itself 'time' \[Das jeweilige Dasein selbst ist (die) Zeit\].\(^7\) If this is borne out by phenomena, our

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\(^{1}\) More concretely the ongoing business of Dasein as care.
\(^{2}\) the as another possibility!
\(^{3}\) Dasein always in – but not – alongside distinct possibilities.
\(^{4}\) ? morality!!
\(^{5}\) being complete!
\(^{6}\) parergon \[by-work\]
\(^{7}\) the objection cannot be overcome if it is meaningless

\(^{5}\) here the analysis of fear – anxiety is constitutive of a distinct mode of existing in possibility.
\(^{6}\) Being complete

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THE CONCEPT OF TIME

preceding analysis of the ontological characteristics of Dasein has at the same time brought out the ways in which ‘time’ exists.\(^{(1)}\)

In its authentic or inauthentic being, Dasein is an entity concerned with being. Running ahead means: to exist ‘in the face of’\(^{(2)}\) one’s ownmost, ultimate possibility. This existing in-the-face-of ... amounts to being futural [Zukünftig-sein]. As it runs ahead, Dasein is the future.\(^{(3)}\)

According to our explication of indeterminate and certain pastness, one’s own future cannot be interpreted as a What that one encounters in the world [weltlich begegnet]\(^{(4)}\).

To grasp certain death as one runs ahead does not mean to expect a future occurrence.\(^{(5)}\) To expect means to expect something in and for the present [Gegenwart]. A future event [das Zukünftige] of the kind that we expect is that-which-has-not-yet-become-present,\(^{(6)}\) that which is wished for or dreaded with respect to the present as something potentially present. Running ahead\(^{(7)}\) does not let that-which-is-not-yet-present come straight towards one into the present. In the same ontological vein, in running ahead one does not fend off in fear that which should not become present. Running ahead lets the future be just what it is.\(^{(8)}\)

Moving away from the present, running ahead dwells on that which is in store for Dasein, namely how Dasein will turn out purely in itself. The persistent endurance [verwahrende Aushalten]\(^{(9)}\) of Dasein's possibility is what we call to be futural [Zukünftig-sein]. In running ahead there is neither expectation of something in the future nor is there a free-floating ‘future

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\(^{(1)}\) and this means that what we have determined so far in Chapter I about time and how time has to be explained in light of itself – all this must be rendered intelligible as an ontological mode of Dasein, thus furnishing us with an outline of the development of its conceptuality [Begrifflichkeit].

\(^{(2)}\) going forward as something discovered – i.e. coming back to oneself.

\(^{(3)}\) and future – in each case my own

\(^{(4)}\) which I can circumspectively walk around / no proximity or distance – / turning around/ and yet in fact ‘directly towards’

\(^{(5)}\) hence no expectant presencing [kein gewärtigendes Gegenwärtigen]

\(^{(6)}\) the worldly ! [das Weltliche !]

\(^{(7)}\) analysis of what is in store for oneself (being one's future)

and expectation. Oneself – as Dasein/ being authentically
temporal – / oneself already and still there
time – is what is in store for itself [Zeit- steht sich in sich bevor]
original state of being futural [ursprüngliches Zukunftsein]
hermeneutically: original, authentic being of time [ursprüngliches eigentliches Zeitsein]

\(^{(8)}\) is itself future

\(^{(9)}\) from where (discovery) and wherein of the already and ‘still’ preserved
CHAPTER 3: DASEIN AND TEMPORALITY

as such'. Running ahead 'is' that being's future which it itself is. But to be futural [zukünftig-sein] means to be 'temporal' ['zeitlich' sein]. Here, temporal does not mean 'in time' but time itself. But past and present lie 'all at once' in temporality. By contrast, what lies 'in' the future is not yet 'in' the present, let alone 'in' the past. However, as a being that exists as its ultimate possibility, which is in other words 'futural', Dasein is its own past and present. Only in this way is this being time itself.

So the complete phenomenal content of 'time' must come to the fore in running ahead if the latter is to be taken as Dasein's futuralness [Zukünftigsein]. To be resolved [Entschlossenheit] – as we have characterized running ahead – is to be futural. Being futural exhibits the character of discovery [Charakter des Entdeckens]. The pastness [das Vorbei] that I seize is the pastness of my own being-in, which I have already been and still am. What comes into view in this pastness is he whose pastness it is. Running ahead is a way of being in which Dasein is directed back to itself, that is, its having been and being now. Right now and at every moment [Augenblick], pastness is certain pastness [gewisse Vorbei]. The state of being the past [Vergangenheit], which we have analysed here, entails the following: at every moment Dasein was faced already with the possibility of running ahead towards the ultimate possibility; at each and every moment, it faced the possibility of choosing between 'being conscientious' ['gewissenhaft'] and 'not being conscientious' ['gewissenlos'].

Through the sense of pastness [im Vorbei], running ahead uncovers the being of that entity which exists as this pastness. But to the extent that Dasein is characterised by succumbing [Verfallen], it is inclined to let itself be defined primarily by the world, and even exclusively so when it comes to Dasein's 'actions'. Through such immersion in the world, it can

11 the coming of something worldly.
12 but future is time
13 wrong: rather: to develop by recourse to Dasein
14 to be the future – show
15 only time is temporal – but not that which can be encountered in time.
16 this is the essence [Wesen] of 'time'
17 not having but being
18 with the future in the sense of what has been and will be.
19 returns
20 coming back by authentically being ahead of oneself
the pastness of my already being-in and 'still' being
21 does this not mean that Dasein entails time in a dual sense – indeed, insofar as it is care – historical being-in is
worldly future – but as sublated [aufgehobene] – or dominant.
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forget *itself*, in other words it can become un-conscientious [gewissen-los]. But resolve, as explorative running ahead [entdeckendes Vorlaufen], shows such Dasein as having not authentically chosen; such Dasein has, as it were, allowed itself to be chosen by whatever it immersed itself in.

That which we have analysed here as the ‘past’ [Vergangenheit] of a Dasein, which is engaged in running ahead, cannot become a worldly object of consideration for resolve, provided resolve understands itself correctly. Rather, resolve lets Dasein become guilty of its own accord through not having chosen. In becoming and remaining guilty, Dasein, which is engaged in running ahead, is its past [Vergangensein]. But being this past, which resolve (or having chosen) is in the form of futuralness, one thrusts oneself forward, seizing the moment by acting in the mode of the How.

By dint of being its genuine and ultimate possibility and through being its past [Vergangensein], Dasein is discovered and gains its own sight [sichtig] in the specificity of the moment it has seized [Jeweiligkeit des ergriffenen Augenblicks]. This sight, however, is not to be confused with engaged worldly circumspection and even less with gaping inquisitively at something or other. Rather, it is in keeping with the interpreting character of running ahead and manifests itself in Dasein’s clarity [Durchsichtigkeit] about its temporal being [Zeitlichsein]. The clarification

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1) Becoming guilty and repetition
2) guilty – being past
3) So the full phenomenal content of this entity
brought about by running ahead is guided without fail by the indeterminate certainty of one’s own pastness.

Running ahead showed itself to be futural = past = present [Zukünftig=Vergangen=Gegenwärtigsein], that is, temporalness [Zeitlichsein]. That it is at once ‘past’ and also ‘present’ must not trick us into believing that the ‘wholeness’ of time\(^{(1)}\) consists of the sum total of something that is present in the world. The ‘at once’ and ‘also’ point to *one and the same* ontological characteristic [Seinscharakter] of Dasein itself and the fact that it is ‘time’ [‘die Zeit’].

But running ahead makes up Dasein’s existence as genuine possibility: Dasein is constituted as possibility in its facticity. The genuine being [eigentliche Sein] of Dasein is temporalness [Zeitlichsein].\(^{(2)}\) After all, Dasein is the ‘time’ that *exists* in the mode of temporalness [Zeitlichsein]; the being of Dasein is temporality [Zeitlichkeit]. In what way ‘time’ *exists*\(^{(3)}\) and how it *is* temporal, we can understand only by looking at the true being [eigentlichen Sein] of ‘time’.

Our next task is to show the being of inauthenticity in terms of its temporalness.\(^{(4)}\) We have laid the ground for this by analysing the ontological characteristics displayed by Dasein usually and for the most part: *engaged being-in-the-world together with one another under the rule of ‘one’*.\(^{(5)}\) The explication of authentic temporalness has already furnished us with the guiding principles for a temporal interpretation of being-in. Our introductory description of the way in which Dasein ‘has’ time led us to reckoning-with-time and time-keeping. And it is to the temporalness of everyday being-in that we must turn in order to clarify this way of ‘having’ time.\(^{(6)}\) This also enables us to bring out

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\(^{(1)}\)Time is wholeness as an existential [Existenzial].

\(^{(2)}\)in the manner of time - [temporal] - i.e., Dasein is *temporality.*

\(^{(3)}\)that we can no longer pose the question in this way – to show from the perspective of ‘time’

\(^{(4)}\)transition –

\(^{(5)}\)in the sense of the necessary demonstration that if time defines the whole of being – *everydayness* too –

\(^{(6)}\)*being concerned about* [besorgen] being, i.e., *being-in* in the world

being concerned about temporality

being concerned itself a case of being temporal

but it is *not* noticeable! that time [is] emphatically [there].
the difference between inauthentic and authentic temporalness. The different modes of temporalness [Zeitlichsein] reveal, as constitutive ontological possibilities [Seinsmöglichkeiten], that facticity [Faktizität] is temporality [Zeitlichkeit].

How must we approach concerned being-in as temporalness? Being ahead of itself, concern has placed something in the realm of care. The being of concern is intent on taking care of this something [Aus-sein darauf]. That which is cared about does ‘not yet’ exist. This ‘not-yet-existing’ which concern dwells upon does not signify any old case of something not-yet-being-present. Rather, it is the ‘not-yet’ of that which concern [Besorgen] intends to bring about [besorgen] or procure [beschaffen]. And to procure means to secure something in such a way that it is at one’s disposal within the surrounding world. The ‘not-yet’, in each case a specific one, bears a reference to what it will be good for. When concern is directed towards obtaining something and places it in the realm of care, this takes the form of getting something done [Erledigen], doing chores [Verrichten] and making provisions for [Beibringen]. In realizing this concern one always makes use of and harnesses what is available in the surrounding world, i.e., what ‘one’ has already secured for oneself, what is already at hand without requiring any further effort to obtain it [besorgungsunbedürftig].

In doing chores and making provisions, concern is ‘concerned about something or other’ that is, it is concerned with whether the undertaking will turn out well or be completed. For when one is intent on carrying something out [verrichtendes Aussein auf], this has the character of being ‘on the way to …’. Concerned engagement has not yet come to an end. In its concern with worldly things, Dasein discharges its concern for itself. Here, ‘for itself’ signifies: Dasein’s finishing something up and being finished with it. But being finished with something does not entail the

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I. analysis of significance [Bedeutsamkeit] and concern [Besorgens] from the perspective of time.
II. analysis of spatiality through time.
III. the ‘one’
IV. language.
being concerned about time –
as care about the being of Dasein as being-in
being-in in the world as discovering of world
‘nature’
essential difference between how nature is ‘in time’ and how history is ‘in time’
cf. habilitation lecture primitive and worldly.  
1) For now and already available – ‘there’
complete cessation\(^{(1)}\) of concern; the concern is ongoing in the concernful employment of whatever has been produced.

The ontological features [Seinsmomente] of concern to which we have drawn attention exhibit the same characteristic temporalness. To be intent on something that is ‘not-yet’ is to be futural [Zukünftigsein]. But this is not the kind of being [Seinsart] that is characteristic of running ahead. Instead, it signifies: to dwell on something-to-be. This dwelling has the character of awaiting [Gewärtigseins]\(^{(2)}\). One might object here that while that with which one is concerned is ‘something-to-be’ that lies ‘in the future’, concern itself must not be regarded as futural. After all, concern for all things exists ‘in the present’. But at the same time it is evident that the very being-sense [Seinssinn] of being ‘in the future’ (and the corresponding state of being futural [Zukünftigsein]) ‘in the present’ must first of all be determined by our explication of ‘being-in-time’, to which we shall now turn. For now, we may be permitted to approach concern itself as a specific\(^{(3)}\) mode of ‘being futural’ ['Zukünftigsein']\(^{(4)}\).

When one ‘is intent on doing something’ ['Aussein auf'] in the sense of being futural [als Zukünftigsein], one is concerned that that which one cares about [in der Sorge steht] will be rendered present [Gegenwärtigwerden]. Likewise, when our concern is directed at carrying out tasks, by employing tools for instance, we deal with something already present [Gegenwärtigem] that was the object of concern at an earlier point in time. But in the finished thing itself its previous subjection to concern is wiped out, in so far as this finished thing is put to use. Concernful use of something [besorgende Gebrauchen] forgets that thing’s prior subjection to concern [Besorgtwordensein]. And it forgets it all the more, the more unscrupulously it stands in the service of concerned futuralness [besorgenden Zukünftigsein]. This concernful\(^{(5)}\) forgetting\(^{(6)}\) is care’s most common

\(^{(1)}\) but to put at one’s disposal
\(^{(2)}\) cf. what is in store for one [Sichbevorstehen] and expectation [Erwarten]
\(^{(3)}\) as distinguished by authentic future
\(^{(4)}\) to live into the future
\(^{(5)}\) concern – as forgetting/neglecting /
future and past present, that is, temporal
\(^{(6)}\) forgetful having!

forgetfulness constitutive of rendering present [Gegenwärtigen] that which, as a matter of course, is ready to hand [Zuhandenem] and present to hand [Vorhandenem].

to forget and not to wonder!
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way of dwelling on the past. By turning one’s back on the past one lives off one’s concernful futuralness [sorgenden Zukünftigsein]. The character of futuralness [Zukünftigsein] is just as apparent when one is concerned [Besorgen] in the sense of being anxious [Besorgteins]: one expects, hopes or fears something. When anxious about something one is not oriented towards the object of concern, but towards the concern itself: that it will go well and be finished in good time. To expect means: to bear in one’s care that which is soon to be present [demnächst Gegenwärtiges]. Fearing is directed at something that – in the present – could happen to one, get ‘in one’s way’. These modes of dwelling on things to come are entwined with one’s care about what is current [Gegenwärtiges].

On the other hand, what has been lost, i.e. what has disappeared from what is currently available, what failed and therefore could not be forced into the present as a finished product – all this we hold on to in regret and mourning. This clinging to the past becomes what it is by holding on to what is present. To be ‘unable to get over’ ‘a loss’ means: to wish for a thing’s ongoing availability in the present. When one is anxious, the concern as such remains within the realm of one’s care [Sorge], in other words of being-in, which is secured and reassured thanks to its ability to access what is available.

All ontological features [Seinsmomente] of concern display the same mode of temporalness: the object of concern is pulled into the present time of the act of concern [des Besorgens].(1) Again, the basic character of this temporalness of being-in is futuralness [Zukünftigsein].* It dwells on a What, something that will be the case, where ‘will be the case’ ['sein werden'] means ‘to become available in the present’ ['gegenwärtig verfügbar werden']. By contrast, in the case of running ahead, what ‘will-be-the-case’ stays just what it is. Geared towards what will become present [Gegenwärtigwerden], concern awaits that which is ‘not yet’ available.

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* When I gave the abovementioned lecture ['The Concept of Time'], it was brought to my attention that H. Cohen too sees the basic character of time as lying in the future" (cf. Logik der Reinen Erkenntnis, 3rd edition, 1922, p. 151ff. and p. 226; p.128ff. and p. 193ff. in the first edition).

(1) But time in the Kantian sense – in other words still extremely formalized.
This waiting-for [Entgegen-warten] awaits those things already within the remit of one's care; it looks after them and forgets that which has been [des Gewesenen]. Although futuralness [Zukünftigsein] constitutes the dominant temporal feature in concern as well, here it is determined by its entanglement with the present. This entanglement is a manner of being-in. 'At present' ['gegenwärtig'] ordinarily implies something like the presence of the world [Anwesendsein der Welt] and things of the world that we encounter. With regard to being-in, however, ensuring that something 'becomes present' means to have what one awaits encounter one in the present [gewärtigend]. Being-in is the present time [Das In-sein ist die Gegen-wart]. As a property of being-in, being present [Gegenwärtig sein] must be understood in the sense of 'presencing' ['Gegenwärtigen']. The temporalness of concern is defined by this awaiting and forgetting presencing [gewärtigende vergessende Gegenwärtigen].

The surrounding world is present [anwesend] not as a thing-like object [Dingobjekt] but as significance [Bedeutsamkeit]. Concerned taking-one's-bearing [Sichversehen] is guided by significations. Circumspection at once surveys the situation [Lage], because 'initially', rather than groping blindly for the nearest object, it looks ahead to the circumstances. Being circumspective, it looks for suitable materials, the proper place, and the opportune moment. To search for something means to be after something [Aus-sein auf etwas] that is missing - that is no longer available - or that has so far never been available and is to be brought into presence [Anwesendsein]. This searching expresses and articulates itself by way of posing questions. Concern is also engaged in rendering things present when it inquiringly develops [nachfragenden Ausarbeitung] its particular circumspection.

In dealing with the surrounding world, one is for the most part always occupied with what is 'already' there 'beforehand' ['vorweg schon' da]. Against this backdrop, what is 'nearest' comes to apparenct [Vorschein]. The world is opened up by the mode of encountering described above as apparenct. This is so because circumspective opening up is awaiting presencing [gewärtigendes Gegenwärtigen], which is to say that this is the way in which being-in is temporal. The curiosity described above is likewise an index of this temporalness.

In line with this, presencing is not an arbitrary and occasionally occurring property of Dasein. As being-in, Dasein presences. We must grasp the mode of its temporalness in light of its being-in.\(^{\text{i)}}\)

\(^{\text{i)}}\) the other way round! but show temporality in the interpreted being-in.
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the structure of being-in above. Being-in practises interpretation. Its way of being [Seinsweise] is succumbing to the world [Verfallen an die Welt]. Through its concerned engagement with the world it provides for itself – its being-in – in accordance with those opportunities nearest at hand. Presencing provides itself with the opportunities fitting to its temporal being in the world. How is presencing, defined as being-in, temporal?1

Being-in has the character of discovert [Entdecktheit]. The world is opened up to Dasein, which at the same time opens Dasein up to itself. Concerned engagement with the world is circumspective. Dependent on the world, circumspective concern constantly reckons with the world, which means that it manages [besorgt] its being-in in such a way that it always has the proper opportunity for sight [Sicht].2 Whether being-in in fact has sight in any given case is a matter of the state of the world itself [steht bei der Welt selbst]. Sight is or is not available to being-in-the-world depending on whether the sun is present or absent [an-oder abwesend ist] in the heavens. To the extent that being-in looks after [sich besorgt] the opportunity for sight, it must reckon with that which facilitates sight and the fact that visibility constantly varies. We encounter the heavens and the sun – in their varying degrees of availability and elusiveness – in the form of significance: as helpful, indeed crucially helpful to sight. Concern has no need to produce this natural visibility, but to the extent that this visibility is variable,3 presencing being-in must take its bearings from it (wait for it).4

Dasein, which is dependent on sight on account of its discovert [Entdecktheit], is being-together-with-one-another [Miteinandersein], which means speaking-with-one-another [Miteinander-sprechen]. When the sun rises – while being-together-with-one-another on a farmstead, for instance managing the estate and being-at-home there – concerned circumspection says: ‘Now the cattle must be driven out to pasture’. The

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1) Genesis of the time of ‘one’ / why besides the constitutive temporality of everydayness itself time keeping – more precisely – why this extreme concern for time – in Dasein!
because: in the world! and this is presence and change!
2) visibility [Sicht] – low
initially – brightness [Helle]
being-in – with initial and primary (?) sight
which is present entirely as a matter of course and inconspicuously in the still (?) factual Dasein
3) regular, repeated change.
4) daily – primary concern – in the world
Nature of the world [Welt-natur]
CHAPTER 3: DASEIN AND TEMPORALITY

encountered dawn is addressed as the first ‘Now’ of the daily chores [täglichen Besorgens], and indeed in such a way that the ‘Now’ is interpreted as ‘suitable for’ the driving out of the cattle. This Now is a suitable one. It is encountered at dawn and has the ontological characteristic of significance (is appropriate). If it is said aloud to others with whom one is together, it is said in a soliciting – instructing – fashion, or else it is jointly decided upon as this Now, which from then on remains binding with respect to the daily chores [Besorgen]. One adheres to this Now which is encountered with the rising sun. Expectant concern is bound to this suitable Now – as a fixed ‘Then’. It is familiar as that which occurs ‘in the morning’. From now on, in the morning signifies ‘when the cattle will be driven out’.*

To the extent that circumspective being-together-with-each-other must reckon with the presence of the sun (day) as that which facilitates sight, it carries out its work during the day. Hence, in accordance with the concerns of being-in, day itself is interpreted in terms of specific, suitable Nows, just as night is interpreted as the proper Now for resting. Taking a rest is a way of concern’s being [Seinsweise des Besorgens]. That which is not concerned with anything cannot take a break from it. These ‘Nows’ that are available to and suitable for expectant concern [gewärtigende Besorgen] make up the ‘time’ that one reckons with.

As being-in, presencing falls under the sway of the world with which it is concerned. Presencing sees itself in terms of the world that it beholds

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*(1) The way in which oriented space [orientierte Raum] – available – what has been seen [Gesehenes] – the sun is taken as measure
significant locality [Örtlichkeit] –
what is closest – most distant –
(2) this world-circumstance [Weltumstand] not as occurrence
the ordinary interpretation of ‘when the sun rises’ is:
when one drives out the cattle
(3) the claim is preserved in the responding (?) concern
*For timekeeping in antiquity, see the investigation by G. Bilfinger, Der bürgerliche Tag. Untersuchungen über den Beginn des Kalendertages im klassischen Altertum und im christlichen Mittelalter [The Bourgeois Day. Investigations into the Beginning of the Calendar Day in Classical Antiquity and the Christian Middle Ages], 1888; as well as: Die antiken Stundenangaben [Reckoning of Hourly Intervals in Antiquity], 1888.
(4) beginning of day
day’s work
(5) first with the help of the specifically marked significant Now in the day – by day – by night
THE CONCEPT OF TIME

in expectant circumspection. But it articulates and interprets itself in the 'Now', which is to say that the appropriate Nows, the 'time' of being-in, are encountered in the world.  

Primitive Dasein makes do with what we have identified as the 'Then' (by day, at noon, at the time of the public meeting [Volksversammlung], the market). The days merge into seasons, which are ordinarily interpreted as summer and winter in accordance with the priorities of concern (sowing, harvesting) and the respective opportunities for these things (weather).  

Therefore, as being-in, presencing is a manner of being temporal [Zeitlichsein] which, through its circumspection, comes upon 'time' ['die Zeit'] by way of a worldly encounter having the character of significance. For concerned, immersed temporality, 'time' exists in the world.  

'Time', which is there in the world in this way, must be viewed in terms of its phenomenal content and clarified in this light. It must not be interpreted away as illusion.  

Presencing concern adheres to the 'then' ['Dann'] it has settled on. As being-in, it displays the ontological characteristic, described above, of falling under the sway of the world. Immersion in the world at the same time opens up the world. What one encounters through concern becomes more varied, the surrounding world becomes richer, and one's engagement with it more complicated. Accordingly, the 'Thens' inherent in expectant concern, the various appropriate 'Nows', become more varied. Dependent on the multiplicity of things the day brings, concern

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(1) only now 'time'
'one' experiences time in relation to what one is actually addressing in what one is saying now - / time is the sky - / to experience time - but at the same time interpreted in a worldly sense [weltlich]. / this Now-saying - as discovering - of being-in - shapes discoverter [Entdecktheit]. To make 'sight' available - take possession of it - not in grasping, observing fashion
earlier (?) circumspection
precursor of theoretical world-discovery [Weltdeckens]
uprooting [Entwurzelung] of nature from the world.
(2) 'one' is there - in being-together-with-one-another -
fuzziness of this presentation -
'time' not as nature and world, but as 'one'
(but initially interpreted as world, as something in the world - sky
(as öôêî))
public - inter-subjective as being - but still as being-in -
not and never wherein [Wem] -
wherein - in the expression 'in time' /
must allow each thing its time.\footnote{\(\text{1}\)} What is a suitable Now is determined with an eye to circumstances and – to the extent that one’s engagement with the world is always being-together-with-one-another – consideration [Rücksichtnahme] for others and what they are concerned with. Presencing concern looks for the suitable ‘Now’ and inquires into the ‘When’\footnote{\(\text{2}\)}. The ‘Then’, which has to be fixed in each case, must be determinable relative to and for being-together-with-each-other. If in the context of being-together-with-one-another [Miteinandersein] a number of people are to agree upon a particular ‘Then’, this ‘Then’ can no longer be determined in terms of the significance of a specific object of concern. If the carpenter says to the blacksmith: ‘I’ll come when I’ve finished the second leg of the table I’m working on’, this determination no longer means anything. But the villagers know ‘when the cattle are driven out’.

The collectively agreed upon ‘Then’ must be available; that is, it must be intelligible and determinable to everyone involved. Only then can one be sure that the other will arrive on time.

A right time is fixed and announced with regard to the position of the sun.\footnote{\(\text{3}\)} Its presence [Anwesenheit] at definite and easily locatable sites functions as a reference point for whatever ‘needs to be dealt with then’ [‘dann zu Besorgende’]. Now to settle upon a ‘Then’ for periods of time during the day, we do not have at our disposal definite and easily locatable sites where the sun is present. Nor can we take the position of the sun, wherever it may be, as a reference point for a particular concern (such as the construction of a table).

Nevertheless, in our being-together-with-one-another the sky is there for all of us. Moreover, in the shadow\footnote{\(\text{4}\)} that constantly accompanies each one of us we encounter the sun in terms of its alternating presence at

\footnote{\(\text{1}\)} which means: it must be present at many things – now there
now there –
order of the Now
order – as ensuring accessibility of the proper Nows relative to circumstance and what needs to be done [Besorgbarkeiten].

\footnote{\(\text{2}\)} managing one’s time
that everything takes a short while
\footnote{\(\text{3}\)} what we have here – invariance of succession and
determinability – in the context of self-less being-together –
concept of the clock.

\footnote{\(\text{4}\)} movements of the sun in the shadow – cast by something.

the simplest case: the human shadow

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different sites.(1) Throughout the day our shadow is of varying lengths, and these are available as something we may determine; they can be paced out using our own feet. Even though the length of body and feet varies from person to person, the ratio of these remains the same within certain limits of accuracy. (In fact, in being-together-with-one-another within the narrow confines of the most direct surrounding world, the same latitude of the 'place' ('Ortes') is implicitly presupposed.)

'When the shadow is this many feet long', 'then' we shall meet.' To determine jointly the 'Then' in this manner means: to look at the clock.(2) The clock shows the agreed upon 'Then'. Looking at the clock one says: 'Now' it is time for this; not yet time for that; there is no time left for something. Looking at the clock amounts to saying 'Now' and through this saying the right time becomes accessible. The 'Now's' are always either suitable or unsuitable; we encounter them in the form of significance. A reference to something with which we are concerned [ein zu Besorgendes] is constitutive of these 'Now's'. But this reference is left open; the significance in question remains undetermined. Suitable 'Now's' are no longer encountered at definite sunlit spots and they do not refer to a particular concern [bestimmtes Besorgen]. They are displayed on the clock.(3) To the extent that a multitude of Now's is accessible through the clock, 'time' is encountered here in a more explicit way. And precisely because concern orients itself by the clock, we can encounter 'time' ['die Zeit'] through the clock in a worldly sense in all its obtrusiveness.

The more we are immersed in the world through our concerned engagement (now this, then that, and something else again after that), the less 'time' we have. The more frequently and urgently we inquire, in our concerned immersion in the world, about the 'When', the more precious(4)

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1. the position of the sun determinable through the shadow everyone has - casts.
2. The clock indicates the position of the sun - but the point is not to grasp this position - but rather to fix a time to do something with regard to it. the position can be established within the context of our being-together-with-one-another. the clock runs for itself takes its bearing from the sun.

hourglass [Sanduhr]
water clock
a from-to

1. dividing up of time
2. determinable at all times
3. communicable.

What does this mean for the idea of 'having time'
4. preciousness
time becomes. And the more precious it is, the more refined and handy the clock becomes. The phrase uttered in a state of concerned engagement: 'I have no time'. means: now I have no time left for this or for that. In concerned engagement, we are immersed in the available time. It must not be wasted. Even recognizing the 'right Now' must take no 'time'. This preciousness is testimony to the being of time [Sein der Zeit]. 'Time' exists.

The concernful use of the clock [besorgende Gebrauchen der Uhr], as being-in, is characterized by speaking. To look at the clock means to say 'now'. One says 'now' in the process of expectant 'presencing'. Utilizing the clock is a particular way of being temporal [Zeitlichsein], that is, a way of taking care of Dasein [Besorgen des Daseins]. The clock must satisfy this expecting [dem Gewärtigen]. The above-mentioned peasant's clock brings out the ontological sense of the clock. The 'Then' is read off something that is constantly available, in the shape of body and shadow. In using the clock one has recourse to an entity whose availability is founded upon that which is constantly there [Vorhandensein].

In the case of the peasant's clock, being-in [Insein] itself helps make up the clock in the form of the hand and face. The other component is the sun under which Dasein exists. Looking at the clock and reading off the time implies integrating the Now, which is thus explicitly or inexplicitly stated, into something which, in its regular succession, is constantly there [vorhanden] for us in our concerned engagement. Using the clock means that one attends to [besorgen] the constant availability of those things that are present in the world [weltlich Vorhandenen] such that the particular, stated Nows are determined through them.

This determination of the 'Nows' is an act of measuring [Messen]. The determination of duration [Dauer] is founded upon the determination of the Now. Analysis of the latter is secondary to the question of the being of measuring. Measuring amounts to determining something that is present [Gegenwärtiges] by means of something that is present [Gegenwärtiges]. The measurement [Masszahl] brings out how many times

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1) using the clock as a measuring standard
   saying Now - as discovering
   cf. above: preserving the Then. 'then' - as the
   'Nows' specified and already determined in our concerned engagement/
   these are 'then' and everyday futuralness [Zukünftigsein]!
2) constantly present and in itself unalterable
3) hourglass!
4) pre-theoretical determination and measurement
5) 'measure'
as such
a given line segment fits into the whole, measured line, that is to say, it puts at one's disposal the measured line in its full presence [Anwesenheit]. Hence the key point in measuring time [Zeitmessung] is recourse to something that is available as present [Anwesendes] in every Now and which as such allows us to determine every Now.\(^{(1)}\) Using the clock signifies: to be in the world in the mode of presencing [gegenwärtigend in der Welt sein]\(^{(2)}\).

The use of chronometers for scientific purposes\(^{(3)}\) only confirms the ontological character of the mode of conduct inherent to utilizing clocks. The pursuit of knowledge in physics [Erkennen in der Physik] is that kind of being-in-the-world that accomplishes [besorgt] the opening up of the world in accordance with its constant and regular presence [Vorhandensein] and makes the discovered world accessible in scientific findings.\(^{(4)}\) This pursuit of knowledge [Erkennen] is the project of presencing the world as mere nature [blosser Natur], a project that has taken on this task as its own, and which has thus become an autonomous way of being-in (science) [als eine Weise des Inseins (Wissenschaft) eigenständig geworden ist].

Whether the clock allows us to tell the time with precision or provides only an approximation makes no essential difference to the ontological characteristics of that being-in to which it owes its ‘invention’ and further development. The clock exists\(^{(5)}\) because the being-in that identifies the now encounters ‘time’ in a worldly manner. ‘Time’ exists because Dasein is constituted through Dasein’s facticity [Fakticität] as presencing immersion in the world, in other words as care [als Sorgen].

‘Time’ exists; we meet it in our worldly interaction with the clock. For something to be ‘in time’ means that we encounter its occurrence.

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\(^{(1)}\) can be read off!
\(^{(2)}\) measuring!
\(^{(3)}\) Theoretical assertions in the course of discovering nature.
Uplooting nature from the world.
\(^{(4)}\) more to the point
bias towards invariant constants and corresponding development of metrics –
in order to reveal the world [Freigabe der Welt].
Uplooting nature [Entwurzelung der Natur]
= dissolution of enrootedness [= Ablösung der Verwurzelung]
and obscuration through the everyday immersed being-in [nächst aufgehende Insein].
world is concealed through being-in itself.
\(^{(5)}\) the clock exists
because it is Dasein
that discovers – and conceals – the world in temporality [im Zeitlichen] –
that is, time is inherent in discovering, in other words in presencing [im gegenwärtigen].
[Vorhandensein] in expectant presencing [gewärtigenden Gegenwärtigen]. That which is present [Anwesendes] we encounter in the present [Gegenwart], namely when, in saying ‘now’, we open up and interpret the world.\(^1\) ‘The present’ [‘die Gegenwart’] has a peculiar ambiguity: on the one hand, it signifies that which is present [Anwesenheit] in the surrounding world (what is present [die Praesenz]) and on the other it signifies the ‘Now’ (the present time [das Praesens]). This ambiguity reflects the phenomenal fact about Dasein that while the ‘now’—saying Dasein expresses itself by addressing the world (in which it is immersed in its concern), it understands itself in terms of that which is available in the world.

Language, as a basic manner [Grundweise] of being-in-the-world, is itself temporal. The most common form of speaking is expectant conversing with one another [gewärtigendes Miteinandersprechen]. This is why primitive language is presentist [praesentisch]. Prior to the question of how language expresses ‘time’ thematically\(^2\) comes the more fundamental question of how the temporal being [Zeitlichsein] of being-in shows up\(^3\) in language as such. To the extent that it embraces the full ontological character of language outlined above, a theory of tense [Tempuslehre] informed by the temporal being of being-in might\(^4\) be the most plausible means of returning traditional ‘grammar’ to its basic foundations,\(^5\) as the being of language itself demands.\(^6\)

\(^1\)Double meaning of ‘there’ [‘Da’]

\(^2\)that is, conceptually expresses the idea of time

\(^3\)time exists as speaking Dasein.

\(^4\)must

\(^5\)and of developing it through recourse to a logic characteristic of a very specific comprehension of the world, interpreted in a specific way

\(^6\)Speaking – Dasein
At the same time, the manner in which speaking usually [zunächst] expresses ‘time’ itself provides supporting evidence that expectant concern [gewärtigendes Besorgen] is an ontological characteristic of ordinary [nächsten] Dasein.\(^{(1)}\).

The temporalness [Zeitlichsein] of concerned being-in that lives by the clock now also allows us to grasp the temporal character [der Zeitcharakter] that we have deployed from the outset in referring to the being of ordinary concern [nächsten Besorgens], namely everydayness [Alltäglichkeit]. Everydayness expresses the temporalness [Zeitlichsein] in which the ordinary surrounding world of our concern [besorgte nächste Umwelt] and being-in within that world become the monotony of everyday life\(^{(3)}\) [gewohnten Einerlei]. Expectant temporalness [gewärtigende Zeitlichsein] becomes everydayness [Alltäglichkeit] to the extent that being-in succumbs to the world.

In the context of being-together-with-one-another, expectant concern [das Gewärtigen] adheres to the usual and agreed upon ‘Then’ of the day. Dasein is subject to a tacit regulation with respect to its temporalness [Zeitlichseins]. The public and usual ‘Thens’ of daily being-together-with-one-another stamp whatever one is concerned with ‘then’ with the character of humdrum routine [Einerlei], provided that one’s expectant immersion in this concern is at the same time a forgetting.\(^{(4)}\) This concern forgets what is other and new in a given situation and always finds itself facing the ‘same’. And one understands the dreary monotony [Einerlei] of the succession of day and night, to which daily routines [tägliche Einerlei] themselves are subject (Dasein: being-in-the-world), in light of the monotonous routines of

\(^{(1)}\) but in principle this ‘fact’ must be explicated hermeneutically – being-in.

\(^{*}\) Cf. the analyses by E. Cassirer, *Philosophie der Symbolischen Formen. I. Teil: Die Sprache.* 1923, p. 166f. The only essential distinction that is grasped and given clear-cut expression is that between ‘Now’ and ‘Not-Now’. Cassirer differentiates between ‘three progressive stages from temporal feeling to the concept of time’: 1. Now – Not-Now. 2. Completion – Non-Completion (Difference of temporal ‘aspect’ [‘Aktionsarten’]). 3. Abstract categorial concept of time (loc. cit., p.170f.). The fact that the distinction between aspects has preceded the distinction between ‘tempora’ in the Indo-European languages\(^{1}\) shows the primary character of concerned temporalness (besorgenden Zeitlichseins). In line with this, that which is commonly available (the object of concern or, alternatively, that which requires no concerned attention) is spoken of as ‘ready-to-hand in the Now’. 'Slavic!

\(^{(3)}\) humdrum monotony [Einerlei] – as being there!

return of the same

repetition of a possibility

\(^{(4)}\) Forgetting and Sameness with respect to the object of concern [des Besorgten] – the future.
one’s concerns [Einerlei des Besorgten], and by no means as a changeover from light to dark in the sense of a merely occurring variation.

In being-together-with-one-another everyone more or less adheres to the usual ‘Then’. Each person has at the outset given away the ‘time’ that he ‘has’(1) in order to get it back in the form of the time regulated through our being-together-with-one-another. Inherent to the ‘Thens’ are pointers to what, in the contexts of togetherness with others, one’s concerns [besorgt] are, what every person does, not as himself, but as a being directed together with others towards the world, in other words what ‘one’ has to do. And this means: ‘time’ (as it is attended to [besorgt] in daily life) is the being-together-with-one-another that succumbs to the world and which, in its being, expresses itself as expectant temporalness [gewärtigend sich ausprechendes Zeitlichsein].

The being of ‘time’ is the being of ‘one’, which, as a peculiar ‘subject’, has taken on the care of that being which is inherent in ordinary, succumbing being-together-with-one-another. Being-together-with-one-another is lived by ‘time’, because the former is time itself, that is to say, it is in the world in the form of the temporalness indicated above. ‘Time’ is the being of ‘nobody’ [‘Die Zeit’ ist das Sein des ‘Niemand’] which is encountered within and in terms of presencing immersion in the world. We must not interpret away the phenomena of ‘one’ and ‘time’, which are so relentlessly dominant [hartnäckigen Herrschaft] that they often seem more ‘real’ than the presence [Vorhandensein] of the world (what is in the world is ‘in time’). Ontological investigation must open itself to these phenomena; it must read off their ontological characteristics from these phenomena themselves.

What we have established so far about the temporal being [Zeitlichsein] of concern and the being of ‘time’ is confirmed by what everyday Dasein itself says about time.(2) Dasein not only reckons with time but also provides a ‘natural’ interpretation of how it encounters time. One says ‘time passes’ but never ‘time arises’. (3) Presencing concern gazes after

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(1) because he himself is it
(2) the following for Being and Time, [Chapter] V [‘Temporality and Historicity’] in terms of the principal outlook not only by way of illustration.
(3) flow of time

 cf. Hegel

 Time is disappearance. The abstraction of ‘devouring’ [‘Verzehrens’]

 cf. Logic, p. 51 f. (GA 21, p. 258)
THE CONCEPT OF TIME

time. It looks for time in the Now that is flowing away, escaping. That something is past means: now it is no more; that something is in the future means: not yet.

The explicit question concerning the 'essence' of time ordinarily remains within the everyday experience of time. Time is the heavens or, rather, their revolving motion; time is movement.* It is clear from both statements that one looks for time in those things one refers to when one specifies the 'Then' of one's concerns on a daily basis: the heavens and the course of the sun. The first surviving treatise on time, whose findings have subsequently been, and still are, highly authoritative, namely Aristotle's discussion in his Physics (ontology of the world), also adheres to the most common way of encountering time.**

Aristotle calls to mind the state of affairs addressed in these statements and concludes: although time is not movement, it is nevertheless part and parcel of what is moved. What is time itself? The possibility of highlighting the phenomenon of time and grasping it ontologically in light of this given state of affairs [vorgegebenen Tatbestand] requires us first to understand 'movement' ontologically. Aristotle discovered movement as an ontological characteristic of entities [des Seienden] and conceptualized it ontologically. Compared with Plato, he reached a more original ground within the same research project [Forschungstendenz]. For the first time, this opened up the possibility of delineating 'time' ontologically.**(1)

The term 'movement' (κίνησις) encompasses all phenomena involving a change [Umschlagen] ‘from-to’ (μεταβολή); alteration (as in the process of dyeing something); increase and decrease; change of place. ἡ τοῦ δινόμει δύναμις ἐνετέλεσθαι ἡ τοιοῦτον, κίνησις ἐστιν.(2). ***

Movement is ἐνετέλεσθαι. This is an ontological characteristic of entities [Seiendem] and signifies: maintaining itself in a state of completing [Fertigsein], the state of being present-at-hand (presence) [Vorhandenheit (Anwesenheit)]. Movement is in fact the present-at-hand-ness of an entity

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* See Aristotle, Physics, Δ 10, 218a 31-b8.
** Bergson's theory of time also clearly developed through an opposing take on Aristotle.
(1) Is the specifically ontological concept of movement constitutively present in the Aristotelian definition of time?
see Physics Γ 2, 201 b31
Physics Θ 5, 257 b8
(2) κίνησις ἐνετέλεσθαι κινητοῦ ἀτελῆς
Compare Met.Θ
*** Physics Γ 1, 201 a 10 sq.
(its presence) in terms of its potentiality as such [in seinem Seinkönnen als solchem]. This potentiality is in each case oriented towards something. The dry, hard timber in the workshop can become a table. To the extent that this potentiality is present-at-hand [vorhanden] in the full scope of its potential, in other words, if the timber is being 'worked on' and for as long as this is so, the timber is in motion. So the specific capacity for forward movement in the shadow cast by the gnomon is present at hand; the shadow moves\(^{(1)}\) from place to place. The concernful watching that traces\(^{(2)}\) the moving shadow says: now here, now here. This now-saying entails a close look at the before and after of places – the sequence of places. Now-saying addresses the moving shadow with regard to its presence [Anwesenheit] and makes this presence explicitly accessible.\(^{(3)}\)

Through the contrast between one Now and another, in each case the entire 'there' of the moving shadow is made available to us.

Now-saying involves 'counting'.\(^{(4)}\) We must take a phenomenological view of the basic function of ordinary counting as the uncovering and making available of that which is present [Anwesendes] in its presentness [Anwesenheit]. To count is to render present.\(^{(5)}\) What is 'counted' with regard to what is moved are the 'Nows'. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος ὁ μισθὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸτερον. (219 b1 sq.) For this is what time is: those aspects of motion that we count with regard to before and after. We can see here the foundation of what has become the traditional concept of time as a moment by moment downstream flow (succession). Whether the Nows are 'counted' in terms of physical objects or psychological processes and 'data', it is always the 'time' we encounter in our expectant concern [gewärtigenden Besorgen] that we take account of. To count is to render present. Hence the ontological proto-history [ontologische Ursprungsgeschichte] of the concept of time* shows that even

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\(^{(1)}\) moves – the presence of its particular capacity.
\(^{(2)}\) opens up – uncovers, gives notice
\(^{(3)}\) counting addresses something and, as such, expresses itself.
\(^{(4)}\) here we must differentiate between
the example geared towards the definition of time
and the example intended to clarify the measuring function of the defined time.
\(^{(5)}\) how? with respect to how many times that which is present at hand is there –
the occurrence of the measuring unit

*Since relativity theory contemplates the foundations of the determination of time, 'time' itself must come into sharper focus in its investigations. In particular, the studies by H. Weyl, whose basic ideas are informed by phenomenology, show a tendency to develop mathematics ever more originarily with an eye to the phenomenon of time. The author
THE CONCEPT OF TIME

when Dasein explicitly inquires into the essence of time, it puts forward questions and solutions in terms of presencing concern [gegenwärtigenden Besorgens].

But this reckoning with time never turns it into ‘space’. Time cannot be spatialized. The analysis of the ontological meaning of the clock and Aristotle’s interpretation of ἡμερον έκθεσις have shown that the calculational approach to time is a particular kind of temporalization [Verzeitlichen] in the mode of presencing [Gegenwärtigen].

Though one allows ‘non-reversibility’ as a distinct predicate of time, one does so on the understanding that one would much rather reverse time’s direction, that is, that one would very much like to repeat and retrieve [wiederholen]¹¹ time and have it completely available in the present moment as something present-at-hand [Gegenwart eines Vorhandenseins].²² That time is always local time [Ortszeit] makes sense from an ontological point of view once we recognize as a primary phenomenological finding that the original ontological character of presencing that is aided by the clock, that is, of being-in within the surrounding world, amounts to being at home in a given place.*

We have now seen that when Dasein takes the form of concerned immersion in the world, it is temporal too, and we have seen how it is temporal: it is an expectant presencing [gewärtigendes Gegenwärtigen] that asks about the ‘When’. This means that facticity [Fakticität] is

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¹¹ iterating

²² by being honest with respect to its presuppositions – via a circuitous route but one in line with its own self-understanding – physics had to come into proximity to the genuine meaning of time as the being of ‘one.’

also temporal with regard to its basic constitution, in other words its dependency on the world. But in its facticity [Fakticität], Dasein is constituted just as primordially as existing possibility [als Möglichkeit]. We saw above that Dasein is temporal in its authentic being as existing possibility. With regard to the basic constitution of facticity [Fakticität], this fully confirms the proposition that ‘Dasein is time’, which we asserted earlier merely on the basis of our analysis of authentic temporalness [eigentlichen Zeitlichsein].

The fundamental character of temporalness [Zeitlichsein] is futurality [Zukünftigsein]. So it is through the different ways in which one is futural that we must discern the difference between authentic temporalness (running ahead) and inauthentic temporalness (succumbing to the world). Expectant concern asks about death in the sense of ‘When will it happen?’ That the When cannot in fact be determined changes nothing about the manner of questioning or the answer with which Dasein, having succumbed to the world, tends to console itself: ‘There is still plenty of time’. It is in fact to the ‘not yet past’ that one clings while expectantly posing questions concerning the When of Pastness [Wann des Vorbei], reckoning how long one has yet to live. Expectant temporalness [gewärtigende Zeitlichsein] does not discern pastness [Vorbei] as an indeterminate, certain possibility. It does not take itself into the future of that being which, in truth, it itself is. Rather, it concerns itself with future things, but only in order to immerse itself in them as something present [Gegenwärtigem] and thus to guard itself against authentic temporality [eigentliche Zeitlichkeit].

Dasein’s authentic being is what it is only if Dasein lives inauthentic being in an authentic way, that is, if it ‘sublates’ [in sich ‘aufhebt’] inauthentic being. It is not something that should or could exist on its own, as it were, apart from inauthentic being. For the How seized when we resolve to run ahead is authentic only as the specific goal of resolute acting [zugreifendes Handeln] in the Now of the time of being-together-with-one-another. The resolved person [der Entschlossene], however, takes his time and does not succumb to that time with which he must reckon as a concerned person [Besorgender].*

It would on the other hand be quite wrong to regard inauthentic temporalness as mere mirage and the being of calculated time as mere

*‘The wise are silent until the right moment: but the swaggering fool is always speaking out of turn.’ Sirach 20, 7 [The translation follows the Oxford Study Bible. – Translator’s note.]
illusion. On the contrary, the dominance of this temporalness [*Herrschaft dieses Zeitlichseins*] within facticity reveals the ontological character of the undoing [*Verhängnis*] inherent in facticity.

Not only does concern's expectant temporalness not vanish — if and when it is lived authentically.\(^{(1)}\) In a worldly and public sense [*weltlich öffentlich*] we cannot even distinguish it from that temporalness that is merely succumbing [*verfallenden Zeitlichkeit*]. This distinction is all the more difficult to make, the more authentically we understand temporalness as resolve. For resolve does not blow its own horn; it does not announce itself publicly with programmatic pronouncements. Its mode of communication [*Mitteilungsart*] is silent exemplary activity together with and for others.

Time is said to be a *principium individuationis*.\(^{(2)}\) In this function, time is understood in the sense of the worldly concept highlighted above of an irreversible sequence of now-positions. How we approach the problem of individuation and the methods we adopt depend on the ontological and logical presuppositions that come into play here, whether explicitly or, more often than not, inexplicitly. Here I merely wish to point out how time, understood as a fundamental character of Dasein itself, individuates.

Through the futuralness [*Zukünftigsein*] of running ahead towards its ultimate possibility Dasein achieves the authenticity of its being. In this state of being Dasein is fetched back from the 'One' and enters the unique thisness and one-time-ness [*Diesmaligkeit*] of its thereness, which it alone can seize, thus becoming entirely non-substitutable by any other being. Here the option no longer exists of individuating Dasein 'historically', contrasting it with other Dasein by reference to what it primarily cares about and what it stands for in the public realm. Time individuates in such a way that it eradicates all possibility of claiming an exceptional status. Time makes everyone literally equal in the sense that death comes to all of us in the end; no one has an edge over anyone else.

Aside from all the other shortcomings of this investigation into time, it would constitute a fundamental misunderstanding of its central theme if its 'findings' were summed up in the form of the categorical proposition:

\(^{(1)}\) *not in a moralizing sense!* But existentially
\(^{(2)}\) cf. Husserl's *formal* concept in Becker
‘Dasein is in each case time’. In addition to methodological competence and mastery of material, what counts in a scientific study is παράδειγμα. It is none other than Aristotle, the exemplar of the level-headed researcher, who demands* that we not only acquaint ourselves with the subject matter, but first acquire a natural sureness of touch in dealing appropriately with the matter at hand. Authentic temporalness lies in resolve. Hence, in the context of a theoretical investigation, we understand time properly only when this understanding culminates in the sort of reflections most suited to bringing Dasein face-to-face with its temporalness [Zeitlichsein]. To appreciate and study time, one must genuinely ask: ‘Am I time?’

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*see De partibus animalium A 1, 639 a 1 sqq.
Chapter 4: Temporality and Historicity

The ontological characteristics of Dasein to which we have drawn attention – being-in, being-with-one-another, speaking, succumbing, discouverture and existing in possibility [Möglichsein] – must be understood

(1) On historicity [Geschichtlichkeit]
genuine historicity – deduction [Deduktion] of radical historiography [radikalen Historie]
pure structure and consideration of possibility – without contemporary critique
the a priori character of deconstruction [Destruktion] as inherent in ontological research [Seinsforschung].
the problem of historicity, cf. [Chapter] I, concluding section on anthropology.
now: historicity and life philosophy – I the viable insights in Dilthey –
asking of preparatory questions! I knowledge about preceding efforts and basic prerequisite.
the question of being [Seinsproblematik]
if it is there – then ! Not the combination of historiography [Historie] and philosophy, but realisation that they are already interconnected – albeit in a deficient manner – that they lost track of each other and therefore lost a firm grasp of the central problems.
later Descartes' life – anthropology – consciousness ! Descartes
with emphasis on consciousness, lived experiences, acts – psychology.
Dilthey / and also phenomenology.
phenomenology – our investitigation so far. [Chapters] I – V, thematically – being.
Research into being [Seinsforschung] – phenomenological
I previous phenomenology! insufficient but potential.
its meaning, thematically, is being [Sein], so even now
Ipush not aside previous research as passé – but rather
understand it in terms of its positive potential.
and thus –
render research consistent by drawing on a sure approach to things.
Philosophical truth
1. historical [historische] 2. a priori – (that is to say, temporal in reality!)
but this determines 3. existentiell [existentzielle]!
equiprimordially. It is only when we grasp the structural connectedness of these characteristics, which are equi­primordial with temporalness, that we can understand fully that being to which we have applied the term ‘care’ [‘Sorge’].\(^1\) Having laid bare the structure of facticity [Faktichtigkeit], we can now begin to see historicity [Geschichtlichkeit]\(^2\) as constitutive of being [Seinsverfassung]. Just as temporality [Zeitlichkeit] emerged in light of the ontological characteristics [Seinscharaktere] we initially described, we can now discern historicity [Geschichtlichkeit] through the phenomenon of temporality [Zeitlichkeit].\(^3\)

Historicity, understood as an ontological characteristic of Dasein, does not refer primarily to a specific mode of Dasein’s occurrence [Vorkommen] in the context of worldly events, into which Dasein enters only to disappear again at some point.\(^4\) Nor does historicity refer to Dasein’s potential to know about such a sequence of events from its own standpoint (?), let alone know them as past sequences. Rather, being-in, as discovery,\(^5\) is itself historical [geschichtlich] in its temporalness [Zeitlichsein]. Dasein is history [Geschichte].

‘History’ is commonly understood to refer to that which is past. To say that something is historically determined means that it is dependent on something that has been at an earlier point in time [früher Gewiesenem]. To say that something is already ‘historical’ means that it is in fact already a thing of the past [Vergangenheit]. The term ‘historical’ signifies an entity’s

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\(^1\) Superficial!

\(^2\) Historicity [Geschichtlichkeit] and discovery

Dasein’s historicality [Historizität].

its historicity [Geschichtlichkeit] is at the same time historicity [Historizität] –

hence the possibility of historiography [Historie] also resides in Dasein –

on the ontic ground of historicity [auf dem ontischen Grunde der Geschichtlichkeit].

historicity historicity and care.

historicity and change – Dasein’s mobility [Bewegtheit].

\(^3\) mobility and relativity

discovery [Entdecktheit] is at the same time concealment [Verborgenheit] – that is, actual accessibility in any given case implies nothing about relativisation of knowledge –

only if the non-genuine idea of validity [Gültigkeit] is brought in.

one cannot deduce from (?) – an element of truth [Wahrheitsmoment] is in principle discerned through recourse to truth [Wahrheit].

\(^4\) what we see emerge in this way – what comes to the fore in this sequence – we must also trace back existentially [existenzial] – equi­primordially – to facticity [Faktizität].

\(^5\) in an indeterminate (?) totality (Tr)!

\(^6\) mobility!
temporalness \([\text{Zeitlichsein}]\), provided that we predicate 'has past' of this entity\(^1\) and that as this past thing, explicitly or not, this entity is part of a present time \([\text{Gegenwart}]\) into which it obtrudes – as something remembered, preserved or forgotten.

In the preceding chapter we interpreted concerned being-in with respect to its temporalness as expectant presencing \([\text{gewärtigendes Gegenwärtigen}]\). But we did not examine interpretation \([\text{Auslegen}]\) – the way in which one executes and appropriates \([\text{Vollzugs-Aneignungsweise}]\) the opening-up of the world and of being-in – in terms of its temporalness \([\text{Zeitlichsein}]\). Now, in interpretatively addressing something as something, one addresses the thing encountered against the background of a more or less explicit acquaintance with it: as a tool, as suitable for this or that, etc. These 'as what', in light of which one interprets the surrounding world as well as the concern that is immersed in it, are not usually newly\(^2\) discovered by Dasein. As being-together-with-others, Dasein grows up in and into this fixed interpretedness \([\text{Ausgelegtheit}]\).

The public interpretedness of Dasein sets the course\(^3\) for whatever is talked about. After all, public interpretedness is of a particular 'time'. What one thinks about this or that 'in our times', which of Dasein's possibilities takes precedence over the other, how one understands Dasein itself, what is 'in the air' – all this tends to determine Dasein's aspirations and needs and the risks it is willing to take.

Our 'time', however, the present time of being-together-with-one-another, is itself articulated 'temporally'. For the most part the 'older generation' can no longer 'keep up with' the particular ways of Dasein. This generation remains bound by the rules that were customary\(^4\) during 'its time' – during the period when the 'middle' generation was growing up and already beginning to challenge the dominant interpretedness, before eventually asserting itself as the middle and leading generation. However, because the temporalness of being-together-with-one-another is founded upon Dasein itself as existence in possibility

\(^1\)that is to say, co-constitutes discoverture
\(^2\)not something that is 'known' ['Gewusstsein']
\(^3\)the past and non-contemporaneity \([\text{Ungleichzeitigkeit}]\) in terms of Dasein \([\text{daseinsmässig}]\) this non-contemporaneity as temporality.
\(^4\)not merely non-contemporaneity in the 'Now.'
\(^4\)not to be understood in terms of the relative validity of what one knows and one's accustomed way of life \([\text{Gewussten und Gehabten}]\), but in terms of the ontological constitution \([\text{Seinsverfassung}]\) of Dasein.
[Möglicheins], some members of the older generation can be far ‘ahead’ even of the youngest generation.*

Dasein, whiling away its own time in each case [als jeweiliges], is at the same time always a generation.\(^1\) So a specific interpretedness precedes every Dasein in the shape of the generation itself.\(^2\) What is preserved in the generation is itself the outcome of earlier views and disputes, earlier interpretations and past concerns. This is especially true of that which persists despite the differences between the individual generations in a particular present time. The wellspring of such persistent elements lies in the past, but they continue to have such an impact in the present [Heute] that their dominance is taken for granted and their development forgotten. Such a forgotten past is inherent in the prevailing interpretedness of being-together-with-one-another. To the extent that Dasein lives from (cares about) this past, it is\(^3\) this past itself. Of the range of possible concerns, this interpretedness has always already settled which things are chiefly cultivated and dealt with within given possible concerns\(^4\) (the subject matter of literature, themes in the plastic arts, and fields of study within the scientific disciplines).\(^5\)

The interpretative undertaking [das auslegende Besorgen] has a firm fore-conception [Vorhabe]. At the same time, it fixes the point of view from which those things that fall within the fore-conception are, as it were, targeted. The possible lines of ‘sight’ ['Sicht'] remain within circumscribed

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*As far as I know, Wilhelm Dilthey was the first to treat the concept of the generation as a historiological category. See Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. V, pp. 36–41.

\(^1\) and ordinarily [Dasein is] from it [the generation] and [is] it, though in an opaque fashion.

\(^2\) generation and being-together-with-one-another, that is, being-together-with-one-another and temporality

\(^3\) not only has – uses – but – borne by it – led by it

\(^4\) in [Chapter] I in manuscript address ontological character under care – forel – character

\(^5\) here

Understanding [Verstehen]
Discoverture [Entdecktheit]
Interpretation [Auslegung]
and historicity [und Geschichtlichkeit]
[Chapter]I to incorporate
horizon for
possible research
‘historiography’ ['Historie']
limits. Interpretation has its fore-sight [Vorsicht]. The world with which we are concerned and being-in itself are both interpreted within the parameters of a particular framework of intelligibility [Verständlichkeit]. After all, one tends to pose questions about the world and the life within it 'to a certain extent'. One has a timeworn conceptuality at one's disposal. It provides the fore-concept [Vorgriff] for the interpretation.

The interpretedness of 'a time' is strictly determined by these structural factors and the variable forms of their realization. And it is precisely the unobtrusiveness of these factors – the fact that one is not aware of them – which gives public interpretedness its taken-for-granted character. However, the 'fore'-character in the structure of interpretedness shows us that it is none other than what has already been [das Gewesene] that jumps ahead [vorausspringt],(1) as it were, of a present time pervaded by interpretedness. Guided by its interpretedness, expectant concern lives its own past [Vergangenheit]. Hence it is through ordinary concerns, jointly pursued with others, that Dasein is what it has been in the past(2) [Gewesensein].

Such temporalness must be understood as forgetful and presencing immersion in the present. This mode of being manifests itself as the inconspicuous, elemental [elementar],(3) historicity of Dasein [Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins]. However, to the extent that presencing constitutes inauthentic temporalness [uneigentliche Zeitlichkeit], we may call this historicity of 'one' inauthentic [uneigentlich].(4)

This inauthentic historicity,(5) which is inherent in immersion in the public realm, can become more or less explicit(6) for Dasein. Because the being-together that has passed away [das Vergangensein des Miteinander]...

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(1) has been said – part of facticity. That is, is historical [geschichtlich]. The happening of this being mobility from the perspective of temporality.

(2) It is what it already was –

(3) 'what is 'ahead' as 'already'

(4) root – of historical consciousness [historisches Bewusstsein] and debased meaning [abgefallener Sinn].

(5) a priori relation between historicity [Geschichtlichkeit] and historicality [Historizitat]

(6) explicitness as the how of discover
is already embedded unobtrusively in contemporary interpretedness, it is possible for concern to uncover it as that which has been. The past as such can be placed within the remit of care. Dasein cultivates the past – it has tradition. Dasein is concerned not to forget former times, and this explicit attention is necessary because as expectant presencing Dasein has an inherent tendency to forget.

Having a tradition generally implies that the past is rendered present. The past is understood as the bygone present [vorbeigegangene Gegenwart]. As far as possible, tradition is meant to conserve the past for the present, namely as the irrecoverable quantity it is taken to be. The concernful conservation of a tradition may assume the form of an autonomous project [eigenständigen Aufgabe]. Interpreting Dasein looks after its past. By way of such interpretative investigation Dasein uncovers what has gone by, beyond whatever is rendered present in the particular tradition. Such interpretation views the past within the horizon available to it in its own present time. Everyday interpretation understands Dasein in terms of the world with which Dasein is concerned. For this reason the Dasein of the past is interrogated with regard to its world, what it used to do at that time, and what happened in the surrounding world of this life gone by. The past becomes a topic of interpretation as world history. So Dasein, which is historical in itself, may seize the opportunity to view things through a historical lens – to be historiological [historisch zu sein]. In contrast to historicity [Geschichtlichkeit] and in accordance with the root meaning of ιστορίην = to find out, when something is said to be historiological [historisch-sein] this refers to the vigorous and emphatic discovery [Entdecken] of the past for a present by a historical being.

To the extent that concerned immersion in the world is characterized by curiosity, historiological investigation may become a new mode of being [Seinsart] – flight or existence [Existenz] lost – or got rid of good riddance!

1 lost or got rid of
2 not weak and resigned tradition
3 traditionalism [Traditionism]
4 what is taken hold of –
crucially – is only raw material [Stoff] and ‘image’ [‘Bild’] of the past
5 Dasein in its entirety
but not in terms of structure
6 the genuine and bogus character of historicality [Historizität]
occasion for succumbing [Verfallen], losing oneself in the world through presencing [gegenwärtigendes Sichverlieren an die Welt]. Based on the multitude of civilizations [Kulturen], world history may become the object of sweeping comparison\(^1\) in which the present form of civilization becomes just one of many, though these other civilizations lie in the past.

World history is rendered accessible through classificatory tables, and this approach to history believes it has attained an objectivity to match that of natural scientific knowledge — thus betraying its character as a form of presencing, that is, of obliterating the past character of the past.\(^2\)

Presencing backwards, as it were, historiological inquiry probes the 'When' of past events. Only in this way can a Dasein that has once existed 'in a given time' become available in its temporality as being-togetherness-with-one-another within the succession of generations. The 'When' is 'counted' ['gezählt']\(^3\) primarily with regard to what happened at a particular time. The historical date [Geschichtszahl] tells us a time and always refers to those issues which Dasein tackled through the various modes of its concern at that time. Here again, the historical date functions as a method of presencing; its purpose is to make 'one particular time' as opposed to another available to presencing consideration with respect to what it has been [Gewesensein] as distinct from other times.\(^4\).

\(^1\)therefore 'comparison'

\(^2\)the past as the ordinary temporal character of historicity — provided that the past-present [Gegenwarts-Vergangenheit] and present [?] are understood in a worldly sense.

\(^3\)counting

\(^4\)within the total presence [Praesenz] of an ordered, determinable sequence that one can run through.

* Compare ‘Der Zeitbegriff in den Geschichtswissenschaften’, loc. cit., p. 182ff. While the
CHAPTER 4: TEMPORALITY AND HISTORICITY(1)

The structural aspects of fore-conception, fore-sight, and fore-concept described above not only characterise the kind of interpretation that facilitates and preserves everyday Dasein's circumspection, but every interpretation, including explicitly historiological investigation. They constitute a given *hermeneutic situation*, which is the ontological condition *[Seinsmöglichkeit]* for every interpretation.

Depending on whether the hermeneutic situation is seized originally or merely taken over, the following points are settled for historiological research: 1) *as what* the past Dasein is taken in advance to be (as an expression of a culture, as a person, as a thing in the causal nexus of events), 2) from which angle Dasein, pre-conceived in this way, is to become an object of inquiry, and 3) which conceptuality is available for empathic appropriation *[verstehende Aneignen]*.

At first and for the most part, however, the hermeneutic situation remains implicit. The past is appraised both from the perspective of the interpretedness and the average understanding that holds sway in the historian's particular present. The more the public interpretedness – what one understands by art, religion, life, death, destiny, freedom, and guilt at a given time – is taken for granted, the less conspicuous are the dominant ideas within the hermeneutic situation, not least because, right from the start of the investigation, the hermeneutic situation is bound by the initial take on the 'subject matter'. Consequently, though they profess not to read anything into the text in contrast to constructions in the history-of-problems approach *[problemgeschichtlich]*, interpretations in fields such as the history of philosophy and the other historiological disciplines do in fact advance rather curious 'presuppositions' of their own. What they read into the text are the taken-for-granted elements of public opinion; these are the hackneyed concepts characteristic of average understanding, of an arbitrary [view] internal [to some] (?) philosophical position.

People think that indifference to what is settled in advance for every interpretation within the inevitable hermeneutic situation amounts to the exclusion of subjective viewpoints. Such obliviousness to the explicit appropriation of the hermeneutic situation and its constant *revision*\(^{11}\) in the ongoing interpretation reveals the kind of historicalness peculiar of the historical date is seen and explicated with reference to chronology, it is not really understood in terms of its function.\(^6\)

\(^{11}\) the temporality of making revisions
its limits - age -
revision - modifies the possibility of opening-up
THE CONCEPT OF TIME

[Geschichtlichsein] from which such investigation of the past emerges. This is the kind of presencing we have described as inauthentic temporalness [uneigentliches Zeitlichsein]. This particular historicalness [Geschichtlichsein] is itself inauthentic.

To the extent that historicalness makes up the temporality of Dasein, a temporality in which Dasein is its past, authentic historicity [eigentliche Geschichtlichkeit] will have to be based on the same temporalness. This is the ontological condition for the possibility of [Seinsmöglichkeit] authentic historiological investigation [historischen Erkennens]. But this means: the hermeneutic situation of historiological investigation can be developed only on the basis of authentic temporalness, the futuralness of running ahead. This brings out how historiological investigation is related to the past. The past is not a present time that has passed by; rather, the past's being [das Vergangensein] is set free only through its state of having been [seinem Gewesensein]. The past reveals itself as that definitive state of one's having been that is characteristic of futuralness [Zukünftigsein], a futuralness which one resolves to embrace through grappling with the past. Authentic historicity is not a matter of presencing something, but that state of being futural [Zukünftigsein] in which one readies oneself to receive the right impetus from the past in order to open it up. In such futuralness [Zukünftigsein] historiological investigation enters the present; it becomes critique of the present. And this futuralness [Zukünftigsein] is not care for future generations. Rather, as the basic manner of being temporal, it is in fact the right way of becoming contemporary [Gegenwärtig-werden].

To the extent that the authenticity of Dasein [Eigentlichkeit des Daseins] lies in the originality of resolve [Ursprünglichkeit der Entschlossenheit], one can neither relieve future generations of this resolve nor make it easier for them. Provided it has understood itself in terms of the authenticity of its being, every age must start 'from scratch'.\(^{1}\) The more originarily it is able to do this, the more historical [geschichtlicher] it is.

As Dasein's self-interpretation, historiological investigation must become transparent to itself through the manner in which it challenges the past. In other words, elaboration of the hermeneutic situation is part and parcel of the performance of genuine interpretation itself. It is the hermeneutic situation that determines how much and how originarily

\(^{1}\) Particularly with respect to the most crucial aspect of its being – the interpretation of Dasein – hence this leaping back [Rückspringen] as true continuity.
we open up the past. And because the hermeneutic situation develops in line with the degree to which the investigating Dasein has become transparent to itself (in its resolve), one cannot lay down general rules for its development.

The meaning of being [Seinssinn] differs within the various possibilities of Dasein (art, religion, and science) which the relevant historiological disciplines [historischen Disziplinen] aim to comprehend historically [geschichtlich verstanden]. In line with this, researchers’ own historical being [Geschichtlichsein] also differs. It is not just that the history of Christendom differs from a history of literature with respect to subject matter and method. The historian’s existence (historicity) also relates differently to the past. *(1)*

Because there is a past inherent to the being of Dasein, that is, Dasein is historical [geschichtlich], it can also be historiological [historisch sein]. And it is only because of this that there are ages [Zeitalter] that are non-historiological [unhistorisch]. Their temporalness, which is primarily determined by presencing, is entirely immersed in the presence of things encountered.

We may state that the same applies to Dasein’s historicalness as to its temporalness. As a possibility, it depends on free choice and the level of the originality of questioning that has been achieved at a particular time.

But if historicity *(2)* co-determines Dasein’s being, it follows that any investigation that aims to open up this entity must be historiological [historisch] if we are to ensure that the research is adequate to the phenomenal content of its subject matter. The ontology of Dasein is faced with the task of interpreting this entity with regard to its being. This requires the proper framing of the hermeneutic situation, anchored in the subject matter itself. Our approach to and interpretation of the ontological characteristics of Dasein must place Dasein as such within the fore-conception [Vorhaben]. Having pinned Dasein down in this way, one

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*(1)* expression and history of symbols - ruins the opening up of existential historicity [existenzialen Geschichtlichkeit] in its various possible forms -

*(2)* see the recent fundamental reflections by Rudolf Unger, ‘Literaturgeschichte als Problemgeschichte’. (Schriften der Königsberger gelehrten Gesellschaft. 1. Jahr. Helt 1) 1924. Unfortunately, for want of access I have been unable to familiarize myself with the study by Unger mentioned on page 16, ‘Herder, Novalis, und Kleist. Studien über die Entwicklung des Todesproblems im Denken und Dichten von Sturm und Drang zur Romantik’. 1922.

*(3)* Dasein’s historicity part and parcel of the hermeneutic basis for fundamental phenomenological analysis.

cf. Introduction.
must examine it with regard to its being and adequately conceptualize the ontological characteristics that this brings to light.\(^{(1)}\)

Is the traditional interpretation of the being of man, which is still ultimately the key concern for philosophy, up to this fundamental task? Are even the basic requirements of the research necessary to carrying out this task understood in terms of their preconditions, let alone taken up? Disregarding a number of variants, modern anthropology can be divided into three components: 1. The old definition of man (animal rationale) holds sway: a living being endowed with reason. 2. This definition was once anchored in a genuine phenomenal content.\(^{(2)}\) As a fixed statement, it became the foundation of the Christian self-interpretation of Dasein, from which the idea of personhood emerged. Via Kant, this idea has continued to exercise an influence up to the present day. The theological interpretation takes its lead from Genesis I, 26: καὶ ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' ἑικόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὄμοιόσωπ. The interpretation of man is governed by the idea of God that comes into play here. At the same time, for faith, man is ‘fallen’ in his current ‘state’. But this fallenness signifies a mode of being [Seinsweise] that cannot come from God. So on the one hand man as created by God is ‘good’; yet he has the potential to fall of his own accord. The supposition of the status corruptionis itself, however, is grounded in one’s particular, more or less original experience of being sinful, which is in turn rooted in the originality or non-originality of one’s relationship to God. Within the secularized philosophical idea of personhood, one’s relationship with God is rendered neutral as a consciousness of norms and values. 3. To the extent that a study of man in his entirety, ‘comprised’ of body, soul, and spirit is to be undertaken, one begins with an analysis of the facts of consciousness (cogitationes), on the basis of which one then advances to corporality [Leiblichkeit] as well as personal acts and lived experiences [Erlebnissen].\(^{(3)}\)

The question of whether such an analysis of lived experiences upholds or abandons the evidentiary privileging of inner over outer perceptions,
whether the primary object of analysis is cognitive 'comportments' or affective lived experiences, whether the theory of consciousness is also understood in the sense of an idealism or according to a 'realist' personalism – all these questions are secondary. The key point is: whether or not the question of the being of this entity is seriously pursued. And if not, we must figure out the reason for this omission. The basic methodological approach of modern anthropology goes back to Descartes. It is in light of his stance that we must explain why here and in all subsequent analysis of consciousness the question of being has been ignored.*

At first sight, one might think that the basic proposition 'cogito, sum' must surely prompt examination of the being of the ego. What is the meaning of being in the statement 'sum'? Is this question even asked? No. It is precisely here that the question of being is ignored. Why? Because this question cannot be asked within the framework of Descartes' approach to the res cogitans. We begin to see why when we look at the thematic privileging of 'consciousness'.

Descartes is looking for a cognitia certa et evidens as the foundation of scientific philosophy. He adopts the ideal of such a scientia from mathematics, that is, he seeks a fundamentum absolutum et simplex for the prima philosophia. This must be given in an intuitus (experientia), thus underpinning all subsequent deductio. In pursuing this ground-laying work, Descartes' epistemic orientation is guided by a concern [Sorge] for certainty and universal validity.

Knowing is iudicare;\(^1\) the iudicium itself is an actus volendi; but voluntas means: propensio in bonum. The bonum of the iudicare (of the knowing) is the verum. But 'true' is that which satisfies the regula generalis, that is, that which is grasped by way of a clara et distincta perceptio.\(^2\) Hence the verum of such a percepicio is an ens certum. An ens certum et inconcussum must be found to serve as a fundamentum absolutum; this is precisely what it means when one interprets knowledge itself as falling under the regula generalis.

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*In the following I set out the key steps in my Descartes interpretation, though only as theses. I have presented this interpretation in a number of lectures and tutorials [Übungen]. A more detailed publication presenting my interpretation of the foundations of medieval ontology will follow at a later date.

\(^{1}\text{why?}
\text{knowing - Dasein}
\text{this voluntas.}
\text{ontological possibility of the human being!}
\text{why?}\)
That which cannot satisfy this rule, every obscurum and relativum, is a cavendum for the assensio and lost in the eversio.

Through this sceptical approach, Descartes finally arrives at a point where there is nothing left that might satisfy this rule. Manebo obstinate defixus. Descartes persists in searching for the certum he has delineated. At the endpoint, the dubitare encounters itself. It becomes evident: dubitare est. But dubitare entails: me dubitare; the me dubitare est aliquid: res cogitans est: sum. A certum has now been discovered. Neither the dubitare nor the me esse is the certum, but rather 'me dubitare' est me 'esse'. The certum is a propositio, a propositional truth [Satzgültigkeit].* The crucial aspect of Descartes’ foundational reflections [Fundamentalbetrachtung] is the switch [Umschlag](1) from the ens verum to the ens certum. This means: Descartes neither intends to investigate a specific entity, namely consciousness, with regard to its being, nor does he want to determine the being of consciousness categorically. All he seeks is a foundation for certainty.(2) That the requirements for such a foundation as mapped out in advance by him are satisfied by a veritas, whose content affirms something(3) about the res cogitans, is given short shrift ontologically. No questions are posed about the ego from an ontological angle. On the contrary, the being of the res cogitans (consciousness) is understood through the lens of medieval ontology. And only on this basis is the abovementioned switch [Umschlag] possible.

Whether explicitly or not, the meaning of ens is ens creatum. The clara et distincta perceptio is found in the res cogitans. This perceptio is a ‘true’ criterion because the res cogitans is an ens, that is, an ens creatum a Deo. But the scholastic proposition applies: omne ens est verum, and to the extent that the ens is not Deus itself, qua ens creatum a Deo. That the ontological sense of an ens creatum is entailed within that of the verum and the certum

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* cf. Principia Philosophiae I §49. Here the 'isque cogitat, non potest non existere dum cogitat' is considered one of the veritates aeternae.
11) switch [Umschlag] motivated by what?
12) and via this detour ancient ontology transposed into cogitatio
or rather via the supposedly
more original beginning [Anfang]
the ontological tradition ruptured,
a tradition which persists
even if something else is attempted.
cf. Lectures on Logic (Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 21)
13) what? 'sum'!
is evident in the antithesis of the verum. The error or falsum is usus non rectus, deficiens a determinatione in bonum = a libertate = a natura humana = a natura creata. The falsum means: non esse ens creatum.*

Here, ‘being’ means that-which-has-been-produced [Hergestellttheit], and the being of God (the non-produced) is also characterised in light of this being-sense [Seinssinnes].** But this concept of being is the very one found in Greek ontology. Yet it is as it were uprooted and free-floating, that is, it has become ‘self-evident’.

For the Greeks, however, ‘being’ means the state of being available [Verfügbarkeit], being present [Anwesenheit]. Even in Aristotle, along with its terminological meaning, οὐσία also retained its original concrete sense: assets [Vermögen], property [Besitz], household [Hausstand] – estate [Anwesen];*** παραμεσία, ‘the present’ [‘die Gegenwart’], merely recapitulates the primary ontological sense of οὐσία in amplified form. Only by elaborating this sense of being can we understand the ontological distinctions made by Aristotle, who secures the genuine foundations for a Greek ontology, which itself followed in the wake of Parmenides. And if the unsurpassed endpoint of the ontological research carried out by Plato and Aristotle, who both want the same thing, forces us to see that they gleaned their concepts from things in themselves, we must then determine the hermeneutic situation of their interpretation of being [Seinsauslegung] as well.

To the extent that interpretation itself is a mode of Dasein [Weise des Dasein], however, the said hermeneutic situation is determined by being-in-the-world. Dasein is usually immersed in its everyday concern for the surrounding world [Umwelt]. A more or less explicit

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*In the synopsis preceding his meditations, Descartes states of the fourth meditation: In quarta probatur ea omnia, quae clare et distincte percipimus, esse vera: simulque in quo ratio falsitatis consistat explicatur: quae necessario sciri debent tam ad praecedentia firmanda, quam ad reliqua intelligenda. [English translation in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. II., transl. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). p. 11: ‘In the Fourth Meditation it is proved that everything that we clearly and distinctly perceive is true, and I also explain what the nature of falsity consists in. These results need to be known both in order to confirm what has gone before and also to make intelligible what is to come later.’] The ontological ground of the concept of truth developed here is evident in Thomas Aquinas, ‘Questiones disputatae, qu. 1’ (Opera. ed. Parm. tom. IX. p.1 sqq.). The theory of ‘transcendentalia’ is developed here. Compare ‘de natura generis’, chapter 2.1.c. tom. XVII. p. 8sqq.

**Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I qu.3.

***For brevity’s sake the following reference may suffice, Bonitz. Index Aristotelicus (Opera ed. I. Bekker tom. V) 544 a 6 sqq.
sense of its being is already inherent in the interpretative discussion of the surrounding world. Above we explicated concerned immersion as expectant presencing. The being-in of Dasein allows a concernful encounter with the world in the present \(\text{[Gegenwart]}\). The world that one deals with is interpreted as \textit{presence} \(\text{[Anwesenheit]}\). Hence that which is always present, always encountered, is genuine presence \(\textit{[eigentliche Anwesenheit]}\) – is what exists as such \(\text{[das Seiende schlechthin]}\) – the heavens.\(^{(1)}\) But to the extent that Dasein ordinarily understands its own being-in via the things it is concerned with, the things it deals with, this also informs the principal sense of being in the interpretation of the being of Dasein itself. It is through dealing with the world that it is opened-up. Hence, human Dasein’s highest mode of being is that which allows it to encounter what genuinely exists \(\text{[das eigentlich Seiende]}\) in its unconcealed state \(\text{(α-λήθευσ)}\). The \textit{αλθεύσεως} which enables entities to be present purely as they are in themselves is the \textit{θεωρεῖν}, the being-in-the-world of the \textit{βίος θεωρητικός}; hence the researcher’s existence \(\text{[Existenz]}\) is \textit{διαγωγή} – pure presencing abiding \(\text{[rein gegenwärtigendes Verweilen]}\).

On this view, one reads the meaning of being off what exists \(\text{[Seiendem]}\) as the \textit{environing world of ordinary concerns}.\(^{(2)}\) The fact that the world encountered in this way is also ‘nature’ is not crucial to the original meaning of this concept of being. The meaning of being is thus interpreted \textit{from the perspective of time}. Presencing, which prefigures the approach to what exists (the world) in Greek ontology, articulates \textit{itself temporally} as it addresses the entities it encounters. The ontology of the world is itself always a way of Dasein’s being \(\text{[Seinsweise]}\) (a style of going about things \(\text{[Umgangsart]}\)) relative to the world in which this Dasein exists. As long as this is so, when it comes to its opportunities to uncover, open-up and interpret the world, ontology will continue to be determined by Dasein’s being, which we have identified as temporalness.

To the extent that time itself exists, however, it is interpreted in light of the dominant concept of being. For Aristotle, who was the first to interpret time, being means that which is \(\text{[Anwesenheit]}\) (the present time

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\(^{(1)}\) what is there in its presence \(\text{(κύησις)}\) – already there.

\(^{(2)}\) and even ‘spirit’ \(\text{[\textit{Geist}]}\) \textit{θεωρεῖν} itself \textit{in turn} by reference to this time as \textit{constant presencing}! not analysable as an ontology of nature \(\text{[Natur Ontologie]}\) in order to attempt, in opposition to it, an ontology of spirit \(\text{[Geist]}\) or consciousness – the same neglect persists as long as Dasein is not really seen for what it \textit{truly} is.
[Gegenwart]). In light of this concept of being, the future is the not-yet-being, the past the no-longer-being. The particular interpretation of the phenomenon of time thus becomes the discriminant that gives away the meaning of being within a given ontology.

In the above explication of Dasein, succumbing [Verfallen] emerged as a basic characteristic [Grundcharakter] of being-in. Every interpretation, as a way of Dasein's being [Seinsart des Daseins], is also determined by this ontological characteristic [Seinscharakter]. What once was originally gleaned and appropriated lapses into average understanding. It becomes a result, living on in set propositions and calcified concepts. Dasein's succumbing historicalness [verfallende Geschichtlichsein] is evident in its ownmost interpretational tradition [Auslegungsgeschichte]. The Greek concept of being is now taken for granted. This is evident in the ontological underpinnings of Descartes' foundational study. The being of the res cogitans (of consciousness) means: to be there present-at-hand [Vorhandensein]. The meaning of 'being' in the statement 'sum' refers to the being of the world. And to the extent that as an analysis of consciousness the basic methodological stance of anthropology and psychology is informed by Descartes or medieval ontology, their investigations into the being of human Dasein continue to neglect fundamentally the task of gleaning the principal sense of being from the 'thing itself', namely Dasein.

But if the task at hand is to investigate Dasein ontologically, the concept of being [Seinsbegriff] that determines the hermeneutic situation of such an interpretation must not be read off the world. Rather, we must get at Dasein's being through a fore-conception [Vorhabe] that also brings into view Dasein's most ordinary mode of being [nächste Seinsart] – the presencing that uncovers the being-character of the world – in order to render this mode of being intelligible as an ontological possibility [Seinsmöglichkeit] of Dasein. This can happen only if we comprehend Dasein's full ontological constitution [vollen Seinsverfassung] as temporality.

Yet the dominance [Herrschaft] of Greek ontology – within both our own interpretational tradition (cf. Hegel's Logic) and the history of our own Dasein – blocks ontological access to Dasein. To gain access means to dismantle [abtragen] this Greek ontology whose self-evident status obscures its dominance, or to dismantle those research strategies influenced by this ontology in such a way that we bring out its

\[1\] hence deconstruction [Destruktion] constitutive of phenomenology
true foundations. We must see to it that the ontology of Dasein, as deconstruction [Destruktion], seizes the opportunity to determine the provenance and adequacy of traditional categories. In doing so, one ensures that the positive explanation of phenomena proceeds on a firm and steady footing.

The phenomenological deconstruction [Destruktion] of ontology and logic amounts to a critique of the present time, but not a critique of Greek ontology. We begin to see the positive aspects of this ontology and can now correctly appropriate it as the ontology of the world in which every Dasein exists. As a thing of the past, we can unlock the historical potential of this ontology for a contemporary age that aims to understand itself.\textsuperscript{(1)}

The ontology of Dasein is historiological knowledge [historisches Erkennen] because the basic constitution of Dasein is historicity [Geschichtlichkeit], which determines the scope of Dasein's interpretations at any given time.

\textsuperscript{(1)}\textit{productive – to be futural! through repetition and future authentic present – not through progress!}
Endnotes


2 The German reads: das ‘Verstehen’. Heidegger’s quotation marks indicate that he is referring to Dilthey’s technical term ‘Verstehen’, understanding, as applied to mental phenomena that we understand intuitively (non-discursively) and sympathetically, re-enact or empathetically identify with, as opposed to our attempts to explain [erklären] the phenomena of (external) nature. – Translator’s note.

3 See the almost identical formulation in the last sentence of § 77 in Being and Time. – Translator’s note.

4 The German reads verstehende Erschliessung, making it clear that Heidegger has Dilthey’s Verstehen in mind. See note 2 above. – Translator’s note.

5 The German reads seelischen Zusammenhang. This is Dilthey’s technical term for the cohesive and coherent connectivity of mental life, where all lived-through episodes (mental, cognitive, volitional) are experienced in the context of one’s whole life. Since ‘connectedness’ has been widely used as a translation, I shall follow that convention here, though the emphasis should be on the holistic cohesion of mental phenomena. All connotations of a mechanistic ‘connection’ of separate elements should be avoided. – Translator’s note.

6 As early as the winter semester of 1919/1920, Heidegger argued that ‘intellectual history [Geistesgeschichte] is the true organon of the comprehension of human life’ (Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1919/20), Gesamtausgabe, Band 58 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1993), p. 246). – Translator’s note.

7 The name ‘Historical School’ refers to a school of thought that emerged in opposition to the ‘metaphysical’ construction of history in Hegel. Making history the overarching reality, the Historical School was determined to bring scientific rigour to the study of history, especially in the field of jurisprudence and economics. – Translator’s note.

8 From here until the middle of page 10 (end of p.14 German pagination) Heidegger took this text and inserted it verbatim in §77 of Being and Time, 450–5 (Sein und Zeit, 527–33). – Translator’s note.

9 This is the Prussian Academy of Sciences for which Dilthey published a number of papers. – Translators’ note.
10 Yorck refers here to the origins in the psyche [Seele], i.e. the origins of the various mental capacities. - Translator's note.

11 This is somewhat out of context. Yorck's point is that Dilthey is content with simply noting the inapplicability of 'constructive' psychology to lived experiences, but leaves out a thorough, epistemological explanation of why that is so. See Briefwechsel, p. 179. - Translator's note.

12 Heidegger's (i.e., 'the author's') note concerning his added emphasis to this quote from Yorck. - Translator's note.

13 In BT, 452 (SZ, 528), Heidegger put this clause in italics, deviating from the original in Briefwechsel (p. 69). - Translator's note.

14 Heidegger also quoted this and the preceding sentence by Yorck in his Kassel Lectures on 'Wilhelm Dilthey's Forschungsarbeit und der gegenwärtige Kampf urn eine historische Weltanschauung', in Dilthey Jahrbuch, Vol. 8, 1993, p.177. - Translator's note.

15 The clause in brackets is Heidegger's own insertion into the quote. It is, the 'author's', i.e., Heidegger's note.

16 See note 8.

17 English translation by Edward Hussey, Aristotle's Physics, Book III & IV (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 43. 'If, then, when we do not mark off any alteration, but the soul seems to remain in one indivisible, it happens as a consequence that we do not think there was any time, and if when we do perceive and mark off [an alteration], then we do say that some time has passed, then it is manifest that there is no time apart from change and alteration'.

18 English translation by Edward Hussey, p. 43. 'We perceive change and time together: even if it is dark and we are not acted upon through the body, but there is some change in the soul'.

19 English translation by Edward Hussey, p. 52. 'But if there is nothing that has it in its nature to count except soul, and of soul [the part which is intellect], then it is impossible that there should be time if there is no soul, except that there could be that X which time is, whatever X makes it what it is; as for example if it is possible for there to be change without soul'.

20 English Translation by F. J. Sheed, Augustine: Confessions, Books I-XIII (Indianapolis/ Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), p. 229. 'It is in you, 0 my mind, that I measure time. Do not bring against me, do not bring against yourself the disorderly throng of your impressions. In you, I say, I measure time. What I measure is the impress produced in you by things as they pass and abiding in you when they have passed: and it is present. I do not measure the things themselves whose passage produced the impress; it is the impress that I measure when I measure time'.

21 Heidegger's wordplay cannot be rendered into English. The German word 'hören' = 'to hear' or 'to listen' is closely related to 'zugehörig sein' = 'to belong to', hence Heidegger's move from one to the other. - Translator's note.

22 Heidegger's wordplay cannot be reproduced in English. The German verb 'to communicate' is 'mitteilen', which literally means 'to share with'. But one should note the closeness in English of communicate and commune or communion. - Translator's note.

23 Heidegger's capitalized preposition 'Um' derives from the words 'um ... herum', meaning 'around', 'surround', 'about'. The linguistic marker 'um', indicating aroundness or surrounding, is also present in the word 'Umwelt', which means the surrounding world. Heidegger can thus move easily from 'um' and/or 'Umwelt' and 'Umgang' [literally 'going about'] to Dasein's spatiality. - Translator's note.

24 'Sichbefinden' can refer to both (1) where one finds oneself and (2) how one feels in that situation. Heidegger almost always draws on both meanings. He also uses the abstract noun
Befindlichkeit to express this idea of Dasein's finding & feeling itself in a situation, which is here translated as 'the state one finds oneself in'. – Translator's note.

25 Note by the German editor: The first sentence of the third chapter, subsequently crossed out by Heidegger, reads:

'Our aim in delineating Dasein's ordinary character of being was to open up Dasein in such a way that we might grasp the nature of "time". But the associated marginal note remained in place. It reads: ‘Showing time to be a basic structure [Grundstruktur] of the being of Dasein itself is intended to make possible a more original philosophical interpretation of the aforementioned structures, thus making time itself intelligible as a basic phenomenon of Dasein’.

26 Heidegger’s quote is taken with only minor modifications from his introduction to the 1924 lecture 'Der Begriff der Zeit.' This lecture is now published in Volume 64 of the Gesamtausgabe, pp. 107-25; it has been translated into English as part of a bilingual edition: Martin Heidegger, The Concept of Time, trans. William McNeill (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992). – Translator’s note.


28 Heidegger’s use of the German word Jeweiligkeit, a nominalization of the adjective jeweilig, draws on two components: 1) the passing of time: je eine Weile [= for a while], whiling away time, and 2) the particularity of this passing of time, in each case a particular while. ‘While-ness’ or ‘whiling away time’ is used to translate Jeweiligkeit. The point is that Dasein is not only in each case ‘mine,’ but also in each case passing its own time, which belongs to it and no one else. – Translator’s note.

29 The phrase ‘das Vorbei’ in ‘Das Vorbei des In-der-Welt-seins’ expresses the idea that at some point one’s Dasein will be ‘over’ [vorne], a thing of the past. But of course its past status is yet to come. It lies in the future so to speak. Nevertheless, this pastness [= das Vorbei] already impinges on one’s present concerns. In subsequent sentences Heidegger shortens this expression das Vorbei des In-der-Welt-seins to das Vorbei, meaning that it is over, or that it is past, here translated as ‘pastness.’ – Translator’s note.

30 Given that Heidegger has already introduced ‘Jeweiligkeit’, while-ness, as a characteristic of Dasein, the use of the word ‘jeweilig’ in this sentence has strong temporal connotations, evoking a reference to ‘je eine Weile,’ a particular while, a particular case of passing time or whiling away. ‘Each time-passing [Jeweilige] Dasein is itself time’ conveys this temporal dimension. See also note 24 above. – Translator’s note.


32 Gegenwart means the present. By inserting a hyphen, Gegen-wart, Heidegger draws attention to the fact that the ending, ‘wart’ ['wait'], hints at the idea that the present is waiting-for [what is not yet]. – Translators’ note.

33 This is the reading suggested to me by F.-W. von Hermann. – Translator’s note.

34 The German sentence reads: Das Dasein is als jeweiliges zugleich immer eine Generation. While each Dasein is ‘there’ for 'a while' [=jeweiliges], namely till its death, it shares the time of its generation as well. – Translator’s note.

35 Heidegger contrasts two things: 1) Dasein is geschichtlich = Dasein is historical, in the sense that its temporalness inevitably makes it historical in its being. Being historical
THE CONCEPT OF TIME

(historicity) is an ontological characteristic of Dasein. 2) Dasein can also adopt an explicit historical stance and view the world through a historical lens. Dasein, in this sense, is historisch, i.e., historiological. However, a historical stance, for instance in form of the historical consciousness advocated by Dilthey and others, does not automatically open up Dasein's historical being [Geschichtlichsein], because the historical stance may turn out to be a specific case of presencing. In this translation, geschichtlich is translated as historical, Geschichtlichsein as historicalness. Historisch is translated here as historiological or to view things through a historical lens.

36 See note 31 above.
Glossary

Alltäglichkeit  
angehen  
   das Angegangenwerden  
Anwesenheit  
   weltlich Anwesendes  
Aufenthalt  
aufgehen in  
   das Aufgehen  
Aus-sein auf  
Auslegung  
   Ausgelegtheit  
beleuten  
   Bedeutsamkeit  
Befindlichkeit  
   Sichbefinden  
begegnen  
besorgen  
   das Besorgen  
   besorgend  
   besorgender Umgang  

everydayness  
to affect  
to be affected  
presence, what is present  
worldly things that are present  
abiding, dwelling  
to be immersed in  
immersion in  
to be intent on, to be after  
interpretation  
interpretedness, what is interpreted  
to signify, to mean  
significance  
the state one finds oneself in  
one’s condition, or how one feels in a situation  

career, daily chores, dealings  
concerned, concernful  
concerned engagement, concerned dealing
### THE CONCEPT OF TIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>German Term</th>
<th>English Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Besorgnis</td>
<td>anxiety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Besorgtsein</td>
<td>to be anxious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Besorgungswelt</td>
<td>world of concern, world as object of our concern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durchsichtigkeit</td>
<td>transparency, clarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eigentlich</td>
<td>actual, real, genuine, authentic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigentlichkeit</td>
<td>authenticity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eigenständig</td>
<td>self-reliant, autonomous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entdeckung</td>
<td>discovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entdecktheit</td>
<td>discouverture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entschlossensein/Entschlossenheit</td>
<td>resolve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>erschliessen</td>
<td>open-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>erschlossen</td>
<td>opened-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>das Erschliessen</td>
<td>opened-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existential</td>
<td>an existential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>existenziell</td>
<td>existentiell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>existenzial</td>
<td>existential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gegenwart</td>
<td>present, the present time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gegenwärtig</td>
<td>to be present, contemporary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geisteswissenschaften</td>
<td>human sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gewärztigen</td>
<td>to await, to expect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerede</td>
<td>idle talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geschichte</td>
<td>history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>geschichtlich</td>
<td>historical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geschichtlichkeit</td>
<td>historicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geschichtlichsein</td>
<td>historical being, historicalness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geschichtswissenschaften</td>
<td>historiography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gestimmmtsein</td>
<td>mood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gewärzigsein</td>
<td>awaiting, expecting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gegenwärtigen</td>
<td>to render present, to presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gewärzigendes Gegenwärtigen</td>
<td>expectant presencing, awaiting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grundcharakter</td>
<td>fundamental or basic character, basic or fundamental structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historie</td>
<td>historiography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>historisch</td>
<td>historiographical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>historisch sein</td>
<td>to view the world through a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historizität</td>
<td>historical lens or to be historiographical historicality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Term</td>
<td>English Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-sein</td>
<td>being-in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jeweilig</td>
<td>whiling away one's time, in each case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeweiligkeit</td>
<td>whiling away one's time, while-ness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>man</td>
<td>one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitwelt</td>
<td>with-world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Möglichkeit</td>
<td>possibility, opportunity, chance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Möglichsein</td>
<td>being in possibility, to exist in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niemand</td>
<td>nobody</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Öffentlichkeit</td>
<td>public realm, public life, <em>sometimes</em> public opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seiendes</td>
<td>entity, entities, <em>sometimes</em> a being, beings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>das Seiende</td>
<td>that which exists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seinsart</td>
<td>mode or kind of being, ontological mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seinsbestand</td>
<td>ontological structure, ontological reality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seinscharakter</td>
<td>ontological characteristic, characteristic of being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seinsweise</td>
<td>way of being, <em>occasionally</em> mode of being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seinsforschung</td>
<td>ontological research, research into being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seinsstruktur</td>
<td>being-structure, ontological structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seinsverfassung</td>
<td>constitution of being, ontological constitution of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seinsverfassung des Dasein</td>
<td>nature of the being of Dasein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selbstwelt</td>
<td>self-world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sicht</td>
<td>sight, visibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sichaussprechen</td>
<td>to talk things out, to express, to speak one's mind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorge</td>
<td>care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struktur des Seins von</td>
<td>ontological structure of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umgang</td>
<td>concerned dealing with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umgangswelt</td>
<td>world that we deal with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umgebung</td>
<td>surroundings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umsicht</td>
<td>circumspection</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>German Word/Phrase</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Umwelt</td>
<td>surrounding world, world around us</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uneigentlich</td>
<td>not genuine, inauthentic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uneigentlichkeit</td>
<td>inauthenticity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unheimlichkeit</td>
<td>uncanniness, unhomeliness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verfallen an die Welt</td>
<td>to fall under the sway of the world, to succumb to the world, to fall under the spell of the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>verfügbar</td>
<td>available, accessible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verhängnis</td>
<td>undoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>versucherisch</td>
<td>seductive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>verweilen</td>
<td>abide, dwell, pass time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verweisungen</td>
<td>significations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verweisungszusammenhänge</td>
<td>significations and references</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>das Vorbei</td>
<td>pastness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vorgriff</td>
<td>fore-concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vorhabe</td>
<td>fore-conception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vorhanden</td>
<td>present, present-at-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vorhandenheit</td>
<td>presentness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vorhandenes</td>
<td>what is present, things present-at-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vorhandensein</td>
<td>presentness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vorlaufen</td>
<td>to run ahead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>das Vorlaufen</td>
<td>running ahead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vorschein</td>
<td>apparency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vorsicht</td>
<td>fore-sight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weltnatur</td>
<td>being of the world, characteristic of the world, nature of the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>das Weltliche</td>
<td>things of the world, the worldly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>das Zeitlichsein</td>
<td>temporalness, being temporal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>die Zeitlichkeit</td>
<td>temporality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zuhanden</td>
<td>ready-to-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zukünftigsein</td>
<td>futuralness, to be futural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zunächst</td>
<td>ordinary, usual, common, at first, in general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zumeist</td>
<td>for the most part</td>
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